Case summaries

HIV-related marginalisation and discrimination can reach the threshold of seriousness to establish persecution but is not sufficient to be granted international protection. In order to benefit from international protection, it must be established that there are personal reasons for a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to HIV-contamination. In this context, seropositivity can be regarded as being part of a social group, which is a valid persecution ground.  In the case at hand, the Court took into account aspects of vulnerability which are unrelated to HIV-status.

When national administrations assess a request for international protection, they must take more precautions when investigating the credibility of facts from the applicant’s story in case of post-traumatic stress and female genital mutilation.

The authorities must comply with their duties to cooperate with the applicant in establishing the relevant facts of the case by being cautious and meticulous before concluding that certain contradictions and inaccuracies exist.

Refugee status was revoked when an individual applied for and received a new passport issued by his/her country of origin.

For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that  he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it.  The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.

In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim.  In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status.  The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.

The applicant, being a young, single man and fit for work, is at no substantial individual risk, neither in his home province Parwan nor in Kabul. Therefore, it can remain undecided if the conflict in Afghanistan constitutes an internal armed conflict. 

The protection provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention can only be afforded if it is established that the asylum applicant, for a valid reason linked to one of the grounds listed in Art 1A(2) of this Convention, is unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of the country(ies) of nationality or, for a stateless person, of the country of habitual residence. 

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.

The concept of internal protection only applies if the asylum-seeker is able to reach the relevant region in a reasonable manner. In the light of Art 8 of the Qualification Directive an asylum-seeker can only be reasonably expected to stay in another part of his country of origin if he does not face risks in this region. The general situation in the region of internal protection and the applicant’s personal circumstances has to be taken into account. It is irrelevant for the granting of refugee status whether such risks likewise exist in the region of origin.