Case summaries

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision to reject his asylum application in the preliminary examination phase. The application was rejected based on the fact that the persecution occurred in the past, the applicant had no current need for protection, and that the circumstances in the country of origin had changed. The applicant appealed stating that he had been granted “prima facie” refugee status by the UNHCR in Benin upon fleeing Togo. The High National Court stated that UNHCR certification did not amount to sufficient evidence of individualised persecution.

This decision concerns an appeal lodged before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court, confirming the Ministry of Interior’s decision to revoke the refugee status of the appellant and her children. This revocation was issued following the voluntary return of the applicant’s husband to Colombia, his country of origin.

This case concerned the consideration of expert medical evidence by asylum decision makers and the link with the assessment of credibility. The Court found that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal failed adequately to consider strong medical evidence relating to torture in assessing the overall credibility of the applicant’s refugee claim. The Court also found that it is incumbent upon the asylum decision maker to give reasons for rejecting the contents of medico-legal reports, especially those with a high probative value.

Serious reasons have to be established in order to apply the exclusion clause in Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e. the material and intentional elements specific to the complicity.

The involvement in a State regular police force does not constitute, in itself, the expression of political opinions or the membership of a particular social group.

This case concerned the treatment of evidence from unaccompanied minors. The applicant was an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan. He claimed asylum on the basis of a fear of persecution both by the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal refused his refugee appeal on the grounds that the applicant was not credible and that his claim was not objectively well-founded. The Court found that the Tribunal Member had engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture in relation to the applicant’s prospect of State protection in Afghanistan, that the Tribunal Member had imputed expectations to the applicant without any consideration of the applicant’s level of maturity at the time, and that the Tribunal Member had failed to consider whether the applicant’s fears in relation to the Taliban were realistic having regard to his age, maturity and the particular circumstances in Northern Afghanistan.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4.3 of the Qualification Directive and the nature of the assessment of the facts and circumstances of a refugee application that should take place. The Court rejected the argument that a failure by a first instance decision-maker to consider each of the mandatory matters set out in Article 4.3 rendered that decision unlawful such that it must be quashed, rather than allowing for any such defect to be cured by an appeal body. The obligation imposed by the Directive is satisfied when any errors or misjudgements at the first instance stage, including deficiencies in complying with Article 4.3 are remedied by an appeal stage.

This case concerned the criteria that needed to be fulfilled in order to establish the existence of an internal armed conflict. It was held that in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, at the time of this decision, a state of internal armed conflict was found to exist without an internal protection alternative. The applicant was therefore considered in need of protection.