Case summaries

The Court found that a simple finding that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria because the population of the country is so large was devoid of any substantiation by reference to the facts of the case or to the circumstances of the applicant and of his family or to the nature of the threat of persecution which relocation would serve to avoid.

The Court indicated that that a finding that internal relocation will provide protection involves a two- fold consideration:

(a) First, the identification - if only in general terms - of an area or place in the country of origin which can reasonably be expected to be free of the particular source of persecution from which the applicant requires protection; and

(b) Secondly, an inquiry sufficient to confirm that a relocation there is feasible and reasonable to expect of the applicant (even if it involves hardship) having regard to the personal circumstances of the applicant and of his family.

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

The appellants argued that they were at risk of re-trafficking and would not find protection anywhere in Albania. The tribunal agreed, and laid down country guidance on the risks facing trafficked women and the absence of effective protection from these risks.

The situation in Logar province in Afghanistan can be characterised as an internal armed conflict. Therefore, the applicant as a member of the civilian population is at a significant risk in terms of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive.

This case concerned the refusal of a Refugee appeal on the basis that Sate protection was available and/or that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria and avoid persecution.  In support of the finding that State was available; the Tribunal Member relied upon part of a UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note (OGN) on Nigeria that had not been provided to the applicant. The Court found that the applicant not afforded fair procedures. She had no opportunity to comment upon the information in the OGN. The Court also found that the issue of whether or not State protection is available does not depend upon the existence of a police complaints procedure but upon a determination that there exists in the country of origin as a matter of current practice, an effective system for the detection, investigation, prosecution and conviction of crimes of the kind which form the subject matter of the complaint.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.

In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.

1. At present, a definition of what constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity has to be primarily based on the elements of these crimes as determined in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
2. In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.
3. As a rule, acts by combatants which form part of combat operations in an internal armed conflict, and which do not constitute crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity (under Section 3 II (1) (1) of the German Asylum Procedure Act), will also not constitute the exclusion ground of a serious non-political crime.

 This case concerned the assessment of the option of internal relocation within Sierra Leone in the context of a threat from a family member. The Court found that, provided that regard has been had to relevant country of origin information, there is no obligation on the decision-maker under Article 8.2 of the Qualification Directive to seek out specific information on general economic and social conditions in a proposed site of re-location in the absence of any specific objection on that basis being put forward by the asylum seeker.

In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.