Case summaries
The degree of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of Iraq was such as to expose persons to a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive merely due to their presence there.
However, other areas of the country (including Baghdad City) did not meet this threshold, and as such, Iraqi nationals could be forcibly returned to these areas as it would not generally be unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to internally relocate there.
This case concerned the risk of violation of Article 3 for the proposed deportation to Iraq of a single female who was a member of the Mandaean religious minority.
In its previous judgment the Court had found that there would be no violation, provided that the applicant was returned to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The case was struck out unanimously by the Grand Chamber pursuant to Article 37 § 1 ECHR given that the applicant had been granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden.
The case concerns an appeal of an Algerian woman to the Council of State, against a decision taken on the 17 June 2013 by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), who rejected the appeal against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person’s (OFPRA) decision concerning the applicant’s application for asylum.
The Council of State annulled the decision of the CNDA, stating that before finding the existence of a reasonable possibility for the applicant to find internal protection in another region of her country of origin, the Court should have looked into which part of the Algerian territory the applicant could, in all safety, access, settle, exist and lead a normal family life without the fear of being persecuted or being exposed to the risk of serious violence from her ex-husband.
The applicant’ s description of a situation which gives rise to a risk to his life or physical integrity, deriving from gender-based violence, social or religious group violence, family/domestic violence, which is accepted, tolerated or not tackled by the State, imposes an ex proprio motu further investigation upon the Judiciary. The latter entails an investigation into the control of violence described by the applicant in terms of whether it is widespread, whether there is impunity for the acts as well as the State’s response
A national decision maker must pay close attention to a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) decision when determining an application for asylum. Such a decision does not create a presumption, however, substantive countervailing reasons are required to justify the decision maker coming to a different decision to the UNHCR.
The Helsinki Administrative Court took the view that a residence permit had to be granted to an Afghan asylum seeker on the grounds of subsidiary protection due a threat of vendetta based on a land dispute.
The Respondent erred if, in a procedure on the extension of subsidiary protection, it failed to examine the threats to safety for repariated Afghan nationals. The Respondent,within the context of finding the facts, had completely failed to examine evidence of the existence of serious harm within the meaning of Section 2(f)(2) of the Asylum Act (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), and thus failed to address the question of whether, in the event of the Appellant returning (as a person who had left Afghanistan) to his country of origin, he would not also be at risk of this form of serious harm. The Respondent took no evidence in respect of this, which is contrary to the provisions of Section13a of the Asylum Act. Moreover, its actions were thus contrary to its own established practice, whereby, in (standard) proceedings on applications for international protection, it routinely ascertains the behaviour of state authorities in relation to unsuccessful asylum applicants or other groups of repatriated persons returning to their country of origin.
In order for subsidiary protection to be provided, the law requires not just a fear but a well-founded fear. This means that a fear of persecution must be real and not fictional. If the genuine nature of an appellant’s fear were to be accepted on the basis of an outline provided to the Respondent in proceedings to extend subsidiary protection, it would lead to a situation where almost all nationals of countries in which any kind of conflict was taking place - even a local one not directly affecting most of the population - would have to be regarded, without further grounds for acceptance, as persons in respect of whom there were serious grounds for believing that they would be exposed to a real risk of serious harm in the event of returning to the country of origin.
The risk of arranged marriage is widespread in Afghanistan, particularly for underage girls, which means that it may constitute grounds for refugee status for women.
In the examination of Article 8 of Directive 2004/83/EC, it is important to take into account the fact that family members may only return together with their children and spouses on the grounds of the protection of marriage and family.
Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.