Case summaries

The Applicant's claims that he would be in danger in Syria because of the civil war there were accepted, because he was a Christian and is considered an enemy by both sides and because he left his country illegally and applied for international protection. The Applicant's fear of being killed as a non-combatant in the civil war was considered to be well-founded. It was considered that there was a reasonable chance that he would be arrested and mistreated since the Syrian state would perceive him to have political beliefs since he had lived abroad and would be considered to be opposed to the regime. Internal relocation of the Applicant was not possible because if the Applicant were to return to any region of Syria he would be at risk of suffering serious harm because of the indiscriminate violence and also because the actor of persecution was national/governmental. The Applicant was recognised as a refugee.

It must be noted that the Applicant’s occupation as a pharmacist meant that according to the country of origin information, he could be a target group for the country`s security forces if they suspected that assistance was being provided to the insurgents. This was considered to constitute the Applicant`s imputed political opinion to be taken into consideration in light of the right to asylum, in other words, circumstances to be considered pursuant to the Geneva Convention.

This case concerned forced child labour in ther country of origin and sexual exploitation of the daughter of an Ethiopian father and an Eritrean mother, strained relations between the two countries, mass expulsions on the basis of ethnic origin, absence of a family network in the country of origin, total illiteracy, unequal treatment of single women, and an inability to integrate into society.

In relation to the absence of a family network, the case considered the stigma which may be suffered as a member of the particular social group of “single women in Ethiopia”.

Should she return to Ethiopia, it was considered likely that the Applicant would be totally ostracised to such an extent that she would be unable to integrate into society and enjoy her legal rights.

An applicant of Palestinian origin was granted refugee status.  UNWRA assistance ceased for reasons beyond the applicant’s control, and therefore the applicant is entitled ipso facto to the benefits provided by the Convention. Consequently, refugee status must be granted automatically. 

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

The Palestinian applicant’s claim was rejected by the authorities as he was not found to be credible. However, the court held that the security situation in the West Bank needed to be reexamined on the basis of the latest country of origin information to assess if the applicant would face a risk of torture or inhuman treatment upon return.

Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.