Case summaries

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

In an application for subsidiary protection made after a failed refugee claim (and after a Deportation Order has been made), the Minister has a discretion to consider the application, which he can exercise if there is new information or altered circumstances. The absence of such means that that the Minister is entitled to refuse to entertain the application; there is no automatic right to make such an application at that late stage of proceedings.

This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.

The term "act of persecution" within the meaning of the Qualification Directive requires that an intentional infringement of a basic right as defined in Art. 9.1 of the Qualification Directive takes place. If the applicant has suffered past persecution (before his/her flight), it is no longer possible to deny refugee status solely on the ground that an internal protection alternative had existed in another part of the country of origin at the time of the flight (change of legal situation in the light of Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive).   

The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.

The Migration Board set out the burden of proof for presenting an internal protection alternative. The area has to be clearly identified as well as being relevant and plausible.

The Ministry of Interior rejected the asylum claim of an Algerian woman who requested protection based on gender persecution by a non-state agent. The High National Court, on appeal, ruled that gender is considered as a “particular social group” and that it is not necessary that the persecution is carried out by state actors but also by non-state actors under certain circumstances. The applicant was granted Refugee status.