Case summaries

An Armenian opposition politician was considered a political refugee by the Migration Court of Appeal. Both the Migration Board and the Migration Court believed the applicant's political commitment and account of events. The Board considered, however, that the Armenian authorities' actions were not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The Migration Court stated the fact that the applicant was not imprisoned for long periods did not imply that the arrests and ill-treatment that took place could be considered as acceptable measures by the authorities. Nor could the actions of the authorities be considered as reasonable or acceptable.  The applicant was considered to be the victim of persecution that was rooted in his political belief.

The Court considered whether an application for international protection by an applicant of Russian nationality based on experiences of persecution in Lithuania (country of asylum) could be dismissed based on the reasoning that Lithuania is deemed to be a safe country of asylum. The Administrative Court held that the question of whether the applicants are in need of international protection based on the treatment they have received in their country of asylum, Lithuania, could not be examined in an asylum procedure in Lithuania.

The case concerned an appeal before the High National Court against the decision of the Spanish Asylum and Refugee Office (Ministry of Interior) rejecting an application for refugee status based on the fact that the applicant entered the EU through Greece. Therefore, following the Dublin II Regulation, Greece would be the responsible country for examining the application for asylum. The High National Court stated that after passing the six month period established by Art 19.3 of the Regulation CE/343/2003 without executing the transfer of the applicant to a Member State considered responsible for the examination, Spain was the responsible country for the case.

A potential violation of Art. 3 of the Convention can be found when a person risks to be extradited to a country where practice of ill-treatment of detainees are reported by reliable sources, notwithstanding possible assurances by the involved public prosecutors of that country.

Given the irreversible and particular serious nature of the harm which might occur if risks relevant under art. 3 of the Convention materialise, an effective remedy to avoid such a harm within the meaning of art. 13 of the Convention requires both an independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim, and a remedy with automatic suspensive effect. 

The Applicant’s fear that he will be forced to fight against persons of the same nationality as part of the compulsory military service may, regarding a particular country of origin and specific nationality, represent a well-founded fear of persecution relevant to asylum.

This case concerned the application of the principle of family unity, where the sponsor had been granted asylum and subsequently acquired the nationality of the country of refuge.

When assessing the availibility of an internal protection alternative the possibilities for the applicant to live together with his/her family in the country of origin should be taken into account. This applies even if the applicant’s family are not seeking asylum in Sweden. However, first a need for international protection needs to be established.

This concerned a claim of persecution as conscientious objector and the use of previous decisions. The first applicant claimed that he faced persecution in Israel because he was a conscientious objector. The Appeals Tribunal Member found that he was only a ‘partial’ objector and referred to a previous decision of his own in which he had entered into a detailed analysis the situation for conscientious objectors in Israel. This previous decision was not made available to the applicants or the legal issues raised were not flagged with the applicants’ legal advisors. The Court found that this previous decision was of such substance, importance and materiality that it ought to have been put to the legal representatives of the applicants for comment before the appeals were determined.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

This case concerned fair procedures, namely the right of an applicant to an oral hearing of his asylum appeal. The Court held that a fair appeal does not necessarily impute a right to be heard orally.