Case summaries

Detention in police stations, places that by their very nature are designed to accommodate people for very short durations, may amount to degrading and inhuman conditions under Art. 3 ECHR if protracted for a long time.

Detention of a person with a view to deportation is contrary to Art. 5 § 1 (f) if unlawful under the Convention or domestic law. 

Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.

The Algerian Kafala system does not create a parent/child relationship within the meaning of direct descendant under Directive 2004/38 but it does fall under the notion of other family members of Article 3(2)(a) of the same Directive. The State must therefore make a balanced and reasonable assessment which considering the age of the child, the closeness of the relationship whether the family have lived together; potential risk of exploitation/trafficking and the best interests of the child. 

The CJEU ruled that an asylum applicant may not be transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to the Member State responsible for processing their application if the living conditions would expose them to a situation of extreme material poverty amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR. In this regard, the Court held that the threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions. Correspondingly, national courts had the obligation to examine, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, whether there was a real risk for the applicant to find himself in such situation of extreme material poverty.

An act of absconding withing the meaning of Dublin III may be presumed when the applicant has left the accommodation allocated to them without informing the competent authorities, provided that they have been informed of this obligation, unless the applicant provides valid reasons for not informing the authorities. 

The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.

The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 

Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.

The CJEU clarified that the Schengen Border Code must be interpreted as not allowing Member States to equate an external border with an internal border at which controls have been reintroduced. So, the Return Directive’s exceptions for third-country national who crossed external borders do not apply to someone in the applicant’s position.

The discretionary clause in Art. 17 II Dublin-III regulation might under certain circumstances oblige the member states to take charge of an applicant. This can be particularly the case, if the competence of the member state under chapter III of the Dublin-III regulation would not be given because of a deadline expiry the applicant had no influence on.

Residence permits obtained in the context of family reunification and long-term resident status, under Directives 2003/86 and 2003/109, may be withdrawn if they were issued on the basis of falsified documents, even if the holders were unaware of the fraud committed. 

Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86 must be interpreted as precluding the rejection of an application for family reunification lodged by a sponsor in favour of a minor of whom she is allegedly the guardian solely on the grounds of lack of official documentary evidence of the family relationship and the sponsor’s inability to explain the absence of such evidence being deemed implausible on the basis of general country of origin information.

Authorities have to take into consideration the specific circumstances of the sponsor and the minor, including the difficulties they faced during and after their flight from their country.

This appeal considered what the correct approach is to the assessment of medical evidence in asylum claims alleging torture. Hence, it was declared that decision-makers can receive assistance from medical experts who are able to offer an opinion about the injury inflicted. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted KV’s appeal against the refusal of asylum to the Upper Tribunal for fresh determination.