Case summaries

The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

According to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia the general credibility of the Applicant is an internationally recognised standard that takes into account numerous conditions when assessing the Applicant’s level of credibility, who does not have any material evidence to prove his persecution. However, the Applicant’s general credibility will provide the necessary trust in his statement as regards his persecution for the state to grant him international protection even without any material or other evidence, merely on the basis of his statements. 

The Appellant should have demanded for an expert to be appointed already during the administrative procedure, at the very latest during the appeal. According to the Supreme Court the objection that a psychiatric expert was not appointed represents an impermissible appeal novelty. The Supreme Court also added that the psychological health of the parties in court procedures is assumed as a fact. 

The High Court held that in a case where a negative recommendation in a first instance application for asylum was based exclusively or primarily upon a finding of a personal lack of credibility, there is an obligation to allow an oral appeal in order to provide an "effective remedy," in the sense of Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, notwithstanding that the Applicant is from a “safe country” and the legislation allows for limiting an Applicant to a written appeal only in those circumstances. For the same reasons, to allow an oral appeal is also required by the right to fair procedures contained in Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.

The High Court held that the Minister is entitled in a subsidiary protection application to rely on the findings made during the refugee status determination process unless these findings are legally wrong or the reasoning is defective. The Applicant cannot “collaterally attack” the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) (which have not otherwise been challenged) through a judicial review of the subsidiary protection decision. The lapse of time amounting to almost one year between the oral hearing by the RAT and the issuing of its decision, could not be challenged in the context of seeking to review the subsequent subsidiary protection decision, and the reliance by the Minister on the RAT’s use of an expert medical report was permissible.

It is the duty of the administrative authority to establish all of the facts that are important in a procedure, and thus to complete the background information for a decision to the extent that it forms a reliable basis for the decision-making itself.

The administrative authority is not relieved of this duty even with regard to the provisions of Section 34(3) of Act No 71/1967 Coll. on administrative procedure (hereinafter the “Administrative Procedure Code“), according to which the participants in a procedure must put forward the evidence that is known to them in support of their claims. 

The Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic may not revoke subsidiary protection in a procedure on extension of subsidiary protection initiated under Section 20(3) of the Asylum Act on the basis of an application to extend protection.

Under Section 20(3) of the Asylum Act, the procedure may result only in a decision to extend or not to extend protection.

This case concerns the State’s obligation to attempt to trace the family members of unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.

The Constitutional Court presents its opinion on the nature of the rights and principles contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU) and on jurisdiction for the decision on questions of interpretation in connection with the CFRU. It gave an answer in the affirmative to the question of whether the CFRU, in particular Article 47 CFRU, is applicable in asylum proceedings if no such violation was found in the actual case at hand.

The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The  first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The  second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.

The case concerns the unlawfulness of detention in Hungary of two Ivorian nationals pending the asylum proceedings.