Case summaries
The practices used by the authorities of a given country in order to exclude some citizens, members of a minority, from nationality can be considered as persecution since they are linked to one of the grounds listed in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) quashed a decision of the Finnish Immigration Service which, applying the Dublin II Regulation, did not examine the application for international protection and decided to return the applicant to Greece. The SAC returned the case to the Immigration Service for a new examination based on new evidence that was presented regarding the applicant’s health.
The Council of State ruled that new evidence submitted in a subsequent application for asylum that is relied upon to prove facts and circumstances in the first application and/or to refute grounds of refusal of the first asylum application, is not to be considered a new element within the meaning of Art 51/8, Belgian Aliens Law (please see comments section below).
In this case the Council of State had to determine whether the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply to asylum applicants that are subject to procedures under the Dublin Regulation. The Council found Member States are bound by the obligations in the Directive until the handling of the applicant’s case or the transfer to the Responsible Member State is enforced.
In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.
The decision of the asylum authority was annulled on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that an internal protection alternative existed.
This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4.3 of the Qualification Directive and the nature of the assessment of the facts and circumstances of a refugee application that should take place. The Court rejected the argument that a failure by a first instance decision-maker to consider each of the mandatory matters set out in Article 4.3 rendered that decision unlawful such that it must be quashed, rather than allowing for any such defect to be cured by an appeal body. The obligation imposed by the Directive is satisfied when any errors or misjudgements at the first instance stage, including deficiencies in complying with Article 4.3 are remedied by an appeal stage.
Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.
Social exclusion can be considered as "exceptionally distressing circumstances" and thus grounds for a residence permit.
A young Christian man who had not been in his country of origin since childhood was not considered eligible for a residence permit based on exceptionally distressing circumstances in spite of the fact that his family resides in Sweden and that he is likely to face social difficulties on his return.