Case summaries

In line with its case-law, the CJEU ruled that Article 67(2) TFEU and Articles 20 and 21 Schengen Borders Code must be interpreted as precluding national legislation allowing police authorities to check the identity of any person, within an area of 30 kilometres from that Member State’s land border with other Schengen states, irrespective of the behaviour of the person concerned and of the existence of specific circumstances, unless that legislation lays down the necessary framework for that power ensuring that the practical exercise of it cannot have an effect equivalent to that of border checks.

These same provisions do not preclude national legislation that permits the police authorities to carry out, on board trains and on the premises of the railways, identity or border crossing document checks on any person, and briefly to stop and question any person for that purpose if those checks are based on knowledge of the situation or border police experience, provided that the exercise of those checks is subject under national law to detailed rules and limitations determining the intensity, frequency and selectivity of the checks.

An Eritrean national claimed refugee status in Switzerland as a result of having allegedly been beaten and tortured for his attempt to escape from military service. His attempt to rely on Article 3 of the Convention of Human Rights to avoid an expulsion order issued by the Swiss authorities was denied as a result of his failure to corroborate his story with factual evidence, inconsistencies in his account and the fact that risk of ill-treatment on his return to Eritrea could be mitigated. 

The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences  (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR. 

The applicant is an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Bon Clan from Mesegawayn in the Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The applicant was originally in 2014 granted subsidiary protection by the Danish Immigration Service under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2). In February 2017, the Danish Immigration Service revoked the applicant’s subsidiary protection.

The account of the applicant regarding his original application was rejected by the Board due to a lack of credibility.

The majority of the Board found probable that the applicant’s daughter if returned to Somalia would be at risk of forced circumcision.

As the primary applicant, the child was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the cohabiting parents were granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) with reference to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1 (A) 2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, published on 22 December 2009 para. 9.

If the applicant comes from a “safe” country, they must be able to prove that there is no protection as understood in the 1951 Geneva Convention, otherwise his application will be rejected. 

The applicant, an ethnic Turkman and an atheist from Aache, Afghanistan had received death threats from local residents close to the imam as well as from his own father because of his apostasy.

The Refugee Appeals Board found that the applicant because of his apostacy would be at risk of being persecuted by local residents, Afghan authorities and the Taleban. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

The claimant’s complaint against a decision denying an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court is dismissed. According to Article 132 (2) Number 1 of the Administrative Court Act, a legal question which is of fundamental significance is required for an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. The burden of proof to demonstrate this is on the claimant. The arguments of the claimant, especially a divergent judgement of the Bavarian Administrative Court dealing with similar facts, refer to questions of facts, which are reserved for the initial appeal court. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

A man of Arab ethnicity and Sudanese nationality sought refuge in Sweden as an asylum seeker after alleged persecution in Sudan. He stressed his involvement in political activities whilst in exile and the risk to his life deportation would pose. He claimed asylum on the basis that refusal would be in violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention which the ECtHR denied.