Case summaries

The transfer of an applicant for asylum to Malta violates the Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”) because Malta’s asylum procedures and system show systemic deficiencies with the inherent risk of subjecting an applicant for asylum to inhuman or degrading treatment.  

The Applicants asked the Administrative Tribunal of Lille (the “Tribunal”) to order the relevant authorities to take urgent interim relief measures to guarantee the fundamental freedoms of the population of the Calais camp.

The Administrative Judge  acceded to several of the applicants’ demands (identification of vulnerable minors, hygiene, cleanliness, emergency vehicle access) and held that the situation in the Calais camp constituted a grave and blatantly illegal breach of the right of the persons residing there not to be subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment.

A person, with a well-founded fear, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, of being harmed by their family if they return to their country of origin because they are a member of a particular social group and are unable to rely on effective protection from the state, may be entitled to claim refugee status.  

Asylum seekers cannot refer to a delayed take charge request by one Member State to another, in particular when the requested Member State has accepted the request. Article 17 (1) of Regulation No. 343/2003 (Dublin II) does not guarantee individual protection for asylum applicants against a transfer to another Member State. 

The case concerns inhuman and degrading treatment by police officers during deportation, including the use of tear gas. The Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR in substantive as well procedural limb. 

On appeal to an Administrative Court, the burden of proof regarding the authenticity of newly presented evidence by a claimant to a Tribunal is on the adverse party, in the present case the Prefect.  A third country national can be returned to a country where he/she can be lawfully admitted. However, as provided by Article L.513-2 of the French Code on Entry of Foreigners and Right to Asylum,  a third country national cannot be returned to a country if the latter proves that his/her life or freedom would be threatened or he/she would be exposed treatments contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. 

The rules of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (“International Protection Directive”) do not prohibit the review of an application for asylum in Germany in a case where an applicant has previously been granted subsidiary protection in another Member State, if such application for asylum has been filed before 20 July 2015. This is because the inadmissibility of applications filed before 20 July 2015 is governed by the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (“Asylum Procedures Directive”). According to Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States may consider an application for asylum as inadmissible if another Member State has granted refugee status, but not if another Member State has granted subsidiary protection. 

There is a real risk that, due to overcrowded accommodation, Hungary can no longer receive returning Dublin claimants. Because of inadequate shelter, the claimant and her two minor children may be subjected to accommodation conditions which contravene Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Before the return of a vulnerable Dublin claimant occurs, Hungary must first be asked to provide guarantees of adequate shelter. 

The applicants, a stateless Palestinian from Syria and two Syrian nationals, had been ordered to be expelled to Syria by the Russian authorities, and were detained in a detention centre in Russia pending this. The Court found that their expulsion to Syria would breach Articles 2 and 3, that Articles 5(4) and 5(1)(f) had been violated with regards to their detention, and that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had breached Article 34.

Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.

It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.

In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.

Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.