Case summaries

The applicants, a stateless Palestinian from Syria and two Syrian nationals, had been ordered to be expelled to Syria by the Russian authorities, and were detained in a detention centre in Russia pending this. The Court found that their expulsion to Syria would breach Articles 2 and 3, that Articles 5(4) and 5(1)(f) had been violated with regards to their detention, and that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had breached Article 34.

Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.

It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.

In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.

Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court considered the appellant’s appeal against the decision by the defendant Secretary of State, by which his application for a Tier 4 student visa had been rejected, on the ground that the applicant had only provided bank statements covering 22 out of the required 28 days. The court held that the refusal of the appellant’s application was unlawful because according to the process instruction the UK Border Agency should not have rejected his application without previously giving the appellant the opportunity to repair the deficit in his evidence. 

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

Where the transfer does not take place within the six months’ time limit, the Member State responsible shall be relieved of its obligations to take charge or to take back the person concerned and responsibility shall then be transferred to the requesting Member State Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.

While accepting that Hungary is the responsible EU State for processing the applicant's asylum application (Article 18(1) Dublin Regulation III), the Court held that  a transfer to Hungary may not occur due to systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary,  that would  put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 3 para 2 Dublin III) .

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary). 

The Returns Directive does not preclude domestic legislation which provides for a prison sentence as a criminal law penalty for non-EU citizens who unlawfully re-enter the country in breach of an entry ban.

The risk of persecutions should be assessed only on the basis of the current state of affairs or a prognosis of the situation in the foreseeable future, based on documented facts and not on general hypothesis regarding potential changes with no probability assessment. There is no doubt that in Ukraine there is a serious crisis, because of armed conflict in the part of the country, but for now there is no real risk that the conflict will cover the whole country.

The applicant is a member of a protestant church, while the dominating religion is orthodox. This circumstance should be duly taken into account when applying the internal protection alternative. The analysis whether the applicant’s fear of persecutions is well founded, should be based on updated information. The information was not updated since it came from April 2014 and the decision was taken in December 2014. The situation in Ukraine is dynamic so the appeal authority should complement the case files accordingly.

The degree of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of Iraq was such as to expose persons to a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive merely due to their presence there.

However, other areas of the country (including Baghdad City) did not meet this threshold, and as such, Iraqi nationals could be forcibly returned to these areas as it would not generally be unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to internally relocate there.