Case summaries
In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), as in Nigeria, non-excised persons can be considered as having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugee status can be granted where there is a considerable risk of excision and insufficient protection against this threat.
The competent authority has to respect as legally binding a court order that determines a certain date of birth and thereby the minority of an applicant. This is also the case if the applicant himself indicates another (earlier) date of birth.
The personal interview of a minor without his legal representative constitutes a significant procedural violation. The facts are presumed to not be ascertained. The competent authority has to ascertain the facts and circumstances once again.
Sending countries are under the obligation not to transfer any individual to another country if any reasonable doubt regarding systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State arises. The mere assumption that the country will comply with its obligations under international and European law is not sufficient and the sending country is under the obligation to comply with the precautionary principle and not allow the transfer.
The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.
Kabul cannot be considered as a reasonable internal flight alternative for the complainant due to the lack of a sustainable social network for him there and no other particular factors which would enable the applicant's removal . Therefore the complainant does not meet the requirements for a removal to Afghanistan.
The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.
NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.
The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.
An asylum seeker was prohibited to travel from Ceuta (Spanish autonomous territory) to the Spanish peninsula despite the fact his application for international protection was being examined.
Transit through a third country cannot be considered a sufficient connection for the purposes of the “safe third country” concept on the sole reason that the country is located in proximity to the country of origin. Other conditions, such as the length of stay or the existence of a supporting network, need to be present for such a connection to exist.
An applicant may not be detained with a view to carrying out a transfer under the Dublin Regulation, in the absence of objective criteria for assessing the existence of a significant risk of absconding, defined in a binding legal provision of general application.