Case summaries
CJEU rules that Hungarian national law which defines ‘serious crime’ (in the context of exclusion from subsidiary protection) as a crime with a possible custodial of 5 years sentence as incompatible with the Qualification Directive. Instead, each crime must be looked at on an individual basis to ascertain its “seriousness”.
CJEU (First Chamber) finds appeal against decision of the General Court dismissing the actions for annulment of the ‘EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016’ manifestly inadmissible.
A birth certificate is not a decision within the meaning of paragraph 108 FamFG. As a child grows older the need of beeing looked after by both its parents decreases. There is no necessity for interim order in the case of family reunification, when the child is about to come of age, as the right to subsequent immigration is not lost upon the child’s coming of age according to the CJEU.
The Court examines the individuals’ circumstances and finds that the appointment with the French authorities to register and assess their asylum cases within a three-month period, coupled with the possibility for the applicants to stay in a foster home at night, access education, healthcare and meals provided by organisations during the day, cannot amount to treatment prohibited under the Convention.
Pursuant to Section 60 paragraph 5 of the Residence Act, refugees recognised abroad cannot be deported to the state in which they are recognised if the living conditions expected there contradict Article 3 of the ECHR. This presupposes that the situation in the country of destination reaches the minimum severity required for Article 3 ECHR, but an "extreme danger" within the meaning of the case-law regarding Section 60 paragraph 7 sentence 5 Residence Act is not a prerequisite.
A Syrian citizen who has been recognised as a refugee in Bulgaria cannot be deported to Bulgaria because of the degrading living conditions awaiting him there.
The official date of an Islamic marriage contracted in Syria needs to be determined with reference to Syrian law. An official notice by the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry’s states that “in the opinion of the Syrian authorities, the date set by the Sharia Court will be the official date of marriage.”
If according to the marriage certificate issued by the Sharia Court the marriage predates a sponsor’s entry into the Netherlands, it is sufficiently established that a valid marriage existed before this entry, also when registration before the Sharia Court took place after the entry.
Court ruled upon the correct test to use when considering returns to Palestine.
Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations.
A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.
Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations.
After being notified of his return decision, set to take place on the same day, the applicant requested an interim measure on Article 3 ECHR grounds in the morning but was nonetheless expelled to Morocco in the afternoon. The Court found no violation of Article 3, regarding the applicant’s expulsion to Morocco, by taking into account subsequent information. It found a violation of Article 34 of the Convention, owing to the fact that the applicant had no sufficient time to file a request to the Court, hence running the risk back then of being potentially subjected to treatment prohibited by the Convention.