Case summaries

This case concerned actors of protection and found with reference to Art 7 of the Qualification Directive that the existence of an effective legal system is not an independent factor for considering the question of whether adequate protection can be provided.

There are "good reasons" within the meaning of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive to consider that the persecution of ethnic Chechens from Chechnya which was solely based on membership of the group will not be repeated. The standard of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive has now replaced the concept of "sufficient safety from persecution" as developed in German case law for refugees who had been subject to persecution before they left their country of origin. 

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a grant of asylum. Having regard to a report from the country of origin, the MOI classified the applicant´s account as not credible. In his appeal, the applicant challenged this decision on the grounds that the MOI did not ascertain the real state of affairs, using only one source of information. The appeal was successful. The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that the country of origin information must be verified from various sources and laid down other conditions for using the country of origin information.

The Court of Appeal considered a piece of legislation that required judges and decision-makers to “take into account, as damaging” to an asylum application’s credibility, certain specified behaviour, including the failure to claim asylum in a safe third country. The Court held that the relevant legislation must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with constitutional principles and which allowed the judiciary to make a global assessment of credibility in the individual case. If the legislation was interpreted as a direction it would risk distorting the fact-finding exercise conducted by the judiciary.

The High Court considered the duty to inquire before authorising detention and fast tracking of asylum seekers and the liability of the state for the failures of contractors and sub contractors.

The European Court of Human Rights found that the expulsion of a Turkish national from Bulgaria violated his right to respect for private and family life (Article 8) and his right to an effective remedy (Article 13). What is more, it held that the Bulgarian authorities did not abide with the procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of nationals. 

This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.