Case summaries
The Court replaced the decision of the OIN to allow the Applicant to remain on non-refoulement grounds (i.e. tolerated status), with a decision to grant the Applicant subsidiary protection status on the grounds that he would be at risk of serious harm on return to his home country (indiscriminate violence).
The case concerned an application for international protection by an Iraqi national. The application was dismissed on the grounds of a failure to establish that his life or person was threatened by reason of indiscriminate violence. The applicant failed to demonstrate individual risk.
Children who were born in France and who claim a fear of persecution because they refuse to be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) in their country of origin fall within the scope of subsidiary protection. The effective implementation of this protection requires that the child is not separated from her mother and that the mother benefits from the same protection.
This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:
- Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
- Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.
The High Administrative Court decided that refugee status had been unlawfully granted to a Chechen. Regardless of the issue of whether Chechens were persecuted as a group, refugee status was excluded since the applicant had access to internal protection in other parts of the Russian Federation.
This case concerned the submission of evidence for a subsequent asylum application where that evidence could have been submitted in support of the initial application.
It was held that since the applicant could already have produced that evidence in his initial asylum application, the reliance on that evidence could not now be considered as evidence relating to new facts and circumstances that could be relied upon to successfully substantiate a subsequent asylum application. Further, the domestic provision of Art 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act was not found to be contrary to Art 32 and 34 of the Procedures Directive.
The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 5 para 1 (f), 4 and 5 with regards to some of the eleven applicants in this case, who were detained as suspected terrorists by UK authorities.
The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.
For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.
'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.
The House of Lords considered a number of issues arising out of the proposed deportation of three foreign nationals on the basis that each was a danger to the national security of the United Kingdom. The Court made three particularly relevant findings: (1) that Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention could be invoked to exclude an individual from the provisions of the Convention on the basis of acts committed after the applicant was recognised as a refugee; (2) Diplomatic assurances as to the treatment of an individual were relevant to assessing how an applicant would be treated upon return to their home State, though their assessment was a matter of fact, and; (3) relying on evidence obtained by torture in a criminal trial did not, as a matter of law, always amount to a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.
This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.