Case summaries

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

In the case of the first Applicant, the exceptional personal circumstances dictate round the clock highly qualified medical care, which is provided by health care institutions in Slovenia, while home care is provided by the second Applicant. If such a sick person were forced to leave the stable conditions in Slovenia and start living in a collective centre in BiH, the first Applicant could suffer inhuman or degrading treatment due to inappropriate health care, which would represent serious harm, which in turn justifies subsidiary protection in Slovenia.

In the event that the second Applicant was returned to the country of origin, she would be separated from the first Applicant (i.e. her family) contrary to the fundamental principle of family unity. Apart from this, in the event of returning to BiH or to a collective centre in BiH, it would be reasonable to believe that, as a young Roma female without a family and means for survival, she would also be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment due to the discrimination against the Roma population.

Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.

This case concerned forced child labour in ther country of origin and sexual exploitation of the daughter of an Ethiopian father and an Eritrean mother, strained relations between the two countries, mass expulsions on the basis of ethnic origin, absence of a family network in the country of origin, total illiteracy, unequal treatment of single women, and an inability to integrate into society.

In relation to the absence of a family network, the case considered the stigma which may be suffered as a member of the particular social group of “single women in Ethiopia”.

Should she return to Ethiopia, it was considered likely that the Applicant would be totally ostracised to such an extent that she would be unable to integrate into society and enjoy her legal rights.

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

The Applicants are not members of a particular social group as defined by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as neither their statements, nor the generally available information would indicate that Serbia considers their citizens originating from Kosovo as a particular group with specific characteristics.

Relying upon the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to ECHR, Article 3 and the decision of the Constitutional Court Up-96/09, as referred to by the court of first instance, the Supreme Court ruled that minimal social and economic protection for an individual who is dependent on state aid does not represent a violation of dignity and therefore does not provide sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. Poor socio-economic conditions, in which the majority of inhabitants of an individual country have found themselves, do not represent sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. 

Criminal sanctions against homosexual acts under Article 319 of the Criminal Code of Senegal constitute a deprivation of the fundamental right to live one’s own sexual and emotional life in freedom and are sufficient in themselves to justify granting refugee status.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.