Case summaries
The Supreme Administrative Count in the case concerning housing for a refugee ruled that the applicant, as a refugee, has found herself in a very specific situation, which was not taken into account by the authority. The applicant was not able to submit all the documents and information about the members of the family who stayed in Chechnya in order to obtain housing. It is beyond any doubt that the applicant and her children cannot live with their relatives, because other members of their family are in Chechnya, so the missing information could not have had any influence on the case whatsoever.
The Supreme Administrative Court found that it is the authority which is obliged to establish all the facts and find the objective truth. Although the local act imposes an obligation on the applicant to present concrete evidence, it cannot be stated, that justifiable problems with completing the evidence by the applicant exempted the authority from its own obligation to examine the case and enabled to automatically dismiss the application. Such an understanding would be inconsistent with article 6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.
Same-sex couples are not excluded from the ambit of the Convention’s family life and cohabiting is not a pre-requisite of establishing family life.
A difference in treatment between persons in relevantly similar positions has occurred in this case since the Croatian Aliens Act has made no provision for same-sex couples seeking a residence permit to join their respective partner, whereas it did contain provisions relating to married and unmarried different-sex couples. The applicant had, therefore, experienced a difference in treatment based on her sexual orientation which had not been justified with weight reasons by the Croatian government. Croatia had, thus, violated Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8.
Tigere (T) appealed against a decision that the legislation which prevented her from obtaining a student loan was compatible with her human right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR. To qualify for a loan, the legislation specified that a student had to (a) be settled (i.e. not subject to immigration laws/restrictions) in the UK when the academic year began; (b) be ordinarily resident in England; (c) been ordinarily resident (i.e. “lawfully”) in the UK for the three years before the start of the course; and (d) their residence in the UK under ‘(c)’ was not at any point for full-time education. T was judged not to have met criteria (a) and (c).
The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.
When due to security reasons an individual cannot be allowed to return to his home where he has lived most of his life, the State has to adopt any other available positive measure to restore his property rights or to provide him with compensation in an appropriate time. Otherwise a violation of both Art. 8 of the Convention and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 may occur.
A decision refusing refugee status is unlawful and arbitrary, if it is solely based on the lack of a “western orientated” lifestyle of the applicants in the country of residence and disregards the lack of educational opportunities in the country of origin. Furthermore, such determination violates the right to equal treatment of foreigners with each other.
The European Court of Human Rights found that extraditing a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin from Russia to Kyrgyzstan would give rise to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It was also found that the repeated delays by the Russian authorities in hearing the applicant’s appeals against his detention in Russia constituted a violation of his article 5 para 4 rights to a speedy judicial decision on the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention between January 2013 and January 2014.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
The Council of State denied the Applicants’ appeal against the decision made by the Board of the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) to include Georgia and the Republic of Albania in the list of safe countries of origin because, amongst other things, these countries are democratic institutions and are parties to the ECHR.
The Council of State granted the Applicants’ appeal against the decision made by the Board of OFPRA to include the Republic of Kosovo in the list of safe countries of origin because, amongst other things, the country’s political and social contexts were unstable and some segments of the population were subject to violence without sufficient police protection.
The ECtHR holds that Russia is in violation of Article 5 ECHR and of Article 4 of Protocol 4 through the implementation of an unlawful administrative practice against a large number of Georgian nationals as a means of identifying them. This led to the arrest, detention and collective expulsion of 4634 Georgians from the Russian Federation and further violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention.