Case summaries

When State Parties do not examine an application for international protection in its mertis based on a safe third country clause, Article 3 still requires that they apply a thorough and comprehensive legal procedure to assess the existence of such risk by looking into updated sources regarding the situation in the receiving third country. Hungary violated Article 3 by failing to conduct an efficient and adequate assessment when applying the safe third country clause for Serbia.

Article 5 cannot be considered as ratione materiae applicable to the Röszke transit zone; the applicants' stay there involved a short waiting time in order for Hungary to verify their right to enter, they had entered on their own initiative and they were free to leave the area in the direction of Serbia. The conditions in the transit zone were not found to breach Article 3 because of the restrictive measure's short duration, the possibility for human contact and the applicants' awareness of the procedure.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the State Attorney. He appealed the National Court’s judgement that accepted to consider an application for the re-examination of international protection that was denied in first instance, and was presented in a different place. The Supreme Court concludes that even if an application is not presented before the competent authority, are these authorities the ones who have to refer the case to the competent. Since this referral was not done, the petition for re-examination is valid.

The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9.  To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.

The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.

The case concerns an application for the annulment of the decision of the Appeals Committee which rejected the applicant’s previous application to overturn the decision of the Regional Asylum Office of Samos whereby he was denied international protection. The Court determined that the case was inadmissible, accepted the relevant justifications given by the Appeals Committee and rejected the application. 

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.

The applicant challenged the Belgian Minister of Asylum and Migration’s decision not to grant him a humanitarian visa via an emergency application before the CALL. He relied on the following grounds: inter alia, (i) his medical condition and (ii) the poor living conditions of the West Bank in Palestine.

The CALL decided (i) these two elements justified an urgent decision, (ii) there was a risk of serious prejudice which would be difficult to remedy if the Minister’s decision was enforced, and (iii) there were serious grounds for invalidating the Minister’s decision since denying a visa to the applicant was likely to constitute a breach of art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), thus fulfilling the three conditions under art. 39/82 of the Belgian Aliens Law 15-12-1980. 

The three cumulative prerequisites for an internal protection alternative are not fulfilled, as it cannot be reasonably expected of the refugee to settle in the proposed part of the country. The UNHCR’s reasonability test is comparable with the national legislation’s one and UNHCR defines the internal protection alternative as ‘unreasonable’.

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.