Case summaries

In assessing the credibility of a sexual orientation-related claim, personal circumstances have to be taken into account. That a person is not able to elaborate on his awareness and acceptance of his sexual orientation, is not sufficient to conclude that the applicant’s story lacks credibility, when the personal circumstances that explain this inability are considered credible.

The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and Sunni Muslim from Kirkuk, Iraq, became aware of his sexual orientation when he was 20/22 years of age and has since had relations with several men and during a longer period worked as a prostitute.

The Refugee Appeals Board accepted the applicants account and found that the applicant as a Kurd from Northern Iraq, according to country of origin information, would risk persecution if he was to return to Iraq and live openly as a homosexual. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act art. 7 (1).

When examining the acceptance of an asylum claim, the authorities have to study whether the testimony of the applicant is based on presumably true facts. Only if it is manifestly false could the admission of this application be denied.

The principle of family unity has to be taken into account regarding the assessment of the circumstances of the applicant, especially since his sister’s application for international protection was accepted.

The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.

The ECtHR declared inadmissible the complaints brought by a Senegalese national who had unsuccessfully applied for asylum in Spain due to his fear of being persecuted in his country of origin on the grounds of his sexual orientation. The complaints were considered premature since the Audiencia Nacional had annulled the administrative decision rejecting his asylum application and the asylum procedure had started afresh. 

The Immigration and Asylum Office unlawfully rejected the claimant’s application for international protection. The court found that the authorities did not objectively assess the evidence and country information provided by the claimant, a Coptic Christian from Egypt. They also failed to correctly interpret the definition of a refugee in accordance with international law and disregarded the special status of the claimant who was an underage applicant.

An asylum applicant who was a victim of previous persecution in their country of origin can be granted refugee status under article 1, C 5) of the Geneva Convention. This is because, due to the severity of the treatment applied, the applicant’s fear is exacerbated to such an extent that, even if the persecution has ceased to exist, a return to the country of origin would be unthinkable. 

Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.