Case summaries

This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on  membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.

It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.

The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.

The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

The Constitutional Court did not unreservedly uphold the judgment of the  Supreme Court. The Appellant in the case sought protection of his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR (and fundamental rights under Article 16(2) of the Constitution), which, in comparison with the other human rights and fundamental freedoms defined in the Convention, is characterised by an absolute and collective guarantee. In view of this, the Constitutional Court found that the standards of protection arising from Article 3 of the Convention (and Article 16(2) of the Constitution) should have been applied in the proceedings, even if such an obligation is not explicitly set out in the legislation, because these secure a greater range of constitutional rights and freedoms within the meaning of Article 154c(1) of the Constitution, and therefore take precedence over the law.

The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

This case concerned the consideration of expert medical evidence by asylum decision makers and the link with the assessment of credibility. The Court found that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal failed adequately to consider strong medical evidence relating to torture in assessing the overall credibility of the applicant’s refugee claim. The Court also found that it is incumbent upon the asylum decision maker to give reasons for rejecting the contents of medico-legal reports, especially those with a high probative value.

This case concerned the revocation of refugee status as a result of the applicant having been convicted of criminal offences. Although the circumstances which led to the recognition of refugee status have not ceased to exist, the revocation of refugee status was deemed to be lawful, since the applicant was convicted of several criminal offences. It was also found that the corresponding provision of German law was in line with Art 14.4 (b) of the Qualification Directive.

The facilitated standard of proof under Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive may be applied to the examination of subsidiary protection. Under German law, subsidiary protection is not excluded on the ground that the applicant is a “danger to the community”.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the deportation of an Iranian national to Iran would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

A potential violation of Art. 3 of the Convention can be found when a person risks to be extradited to a country where practice of ill-treatment of detainees are reported by reliable sources, notwithstanding possible assurances by the involved public prosecutors of that country.

Given the irreversible and particular serious nature of the harm which might occur if risks relevant under art. 3 of the Convention materialise, an effective remedy to avoid such a harm within the meaning of art. 13 of the Convention requires both an independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim, and a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.