Case summaries
Instead of non-refoulement, the Court granted the Applicant subsidiary protection status because he would be at risk of serious harm upon returning to his home country (torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment).
Application from the Turkish Authorities to have the Greek Judicial Authorities issue an extradition notice against A.F., a Turkish citizen seeking asylum in Greece.
The Court ruled against the Turkish Authorities' extradition request, deciding that if the person in question were extradited to Turkey there would be a risk that her situation would be made worse because of her political beliefs and because of her pending application to have her refugee status recognised by the Greek state.
The case concerns the risk of ill-treatment that the applicant would be exposed to if he were sent back to Chad, where he has been already tortured and summoned by the prosecutorial authorities for alleged collaboration with the rebels.
A Gambian asylum seeker’s account of approximately eight years’ imprisonment and torture there was not considered credible. The Immigration Service and the Helsinki Supreme Administrative Courtconsidered the application to be manifestly unfounded and the Supreme Administrative Court did not give leave to appeal on the matter. The UN Committee against Torture had, however, requested that the Applicant not be returned to his home country, The Gambia, until UNCAT had examined the complaint.
The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.
This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.
A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation.
This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.
More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.
The detention of asylum applicants may undermine their ability to claim asylum and that an ‘effective remedy’ requires an appeal with suspensive effect against refoulement in order to prevent irreparable harm, sufficient time to prepare the appeal and effective legal assistance and interpretation.
The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.
This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.