Case summaries
The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.
The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).
The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:
- A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
- The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.
Examining the application as manifestly unfounded requires a three-stage test: (1) whether there is a risk of expulsion abroad or extradition of the person, (2) whether the Applicant could have filed the application sooner, (3) whether it is obvious from the steps taken by the Applicant that they had filed the application with the sole intention of avoiding imminent expulsion or extradition.
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not have, for instance, extraterritorial effect in comparison with Articles 3 and 8 of the same Convention. The return of an individual to a country where he is threatened with constraints on his religious freedom, which do not reach the level of interference with his rights pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, is not in contradiction with the Convention. Such a return cannot even represent prima facie serious harm for the purpose of examining subsidiary protection.
This case concerned the definition of an “internal armed conflict.” Relying on international humanitarian law and in particular on the Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the CALL defined an “internal armed conflict” as continuous conflict between government authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The Call also found that a ceasefire did not necessarily mean that such a conflict had ended.
The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.
Non-state actors (private individuals) can be actors of persecution in relation to persons entitled to asylum, as well as actors of serious harm in relation to persons entitled to subsidiary protection.
This case confirmed that the Qualification Directive makes a clear distinction between refugees and those in need of subsidiary protection. Further, that Art 28 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which considers unfounded applications, is not applicable to those who fall within the scope of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.
This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.