Case summaries

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.

The appellant is a Nigerian national and claims to have left her country because of armed confrontations between the group she belonged to (the Massob) and other armed groups.After a demonstration organised by the Massob to demand freedom and independence for the group, the government retaliated against the demonstrators, killing several people.Therefore, she decided to flee the country with her husband and one year old daughter.During the crossing in a small boat from Morocco to Spain, her daughter died.On these grounds the Supreme Court recognised the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations.

When reaching a decision, the Defendant should have protected the best interest of the child. Taking into account the fact that the Applicant is a minor and providing legal representation for a minor applicant, are necessary elements in the process of demonstrating and establishing the facts. The principle of protecting the best interest of the child has to be enforced when assessing the risk that the absolute rights of the child might be violated if he is returned to his country of origin and needs to be reflected in the Defendant’s burden of proof as well as in the rules and standards of  evidence (in relation to subsidiary protection).

The Defendant should already have started searching for parents during the procedure for international protection and not only once the procedure for removing the child from the state has begun.   

Threats and violence against a person’s family members can be considered as acts of persecution where that person is connected to the facts which previously led to the violence..

The Plaintiff needs to state all circumstances known to him in relation to his persecution; however he does not need to establish a material and legal connection between the persecution and the reasons for persecution.

The fact that somebody is a child in Afghanistan can mean that he belongs to particular social group.

Two main issues are addressed by the Court:

Is the Minister required to re-examine a negative credibility finding by the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) when such is disputed in the subsidiary protection application but has not been the subject of an appeal determination by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) in the refugee status determination procedure?

Does Regulation 4(5) preclude the Minister from taking any steps in the preparation of a deportation order prior to a final determination of the subsidiary protection application?

Both issues are answered by the Court in the negative.

An acceptance by Poland to take back the applicants was invalid because the Austrian Federal Asylum Office failed to inform Poland of the fact that the applicants have the status of subsidiary protection in Austria. As long as the applicants have this status a Dublin procedure is impossible because they have a legal stay in Austria and cannot be expelled.

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

The Plaintiff’s previous experience does not lead to the  conclusion that the Plaintiff is afraid of persecution (in the event that he was returned) based on race, religion, national identity, membership of a particular social group or a certain political belief, as his fear is based on the possible consequences of retribution merely because he fled. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court the fact that he fled from the Taliban does not make him a “member of a particular social group” on the basis of which his refugee status could be recognised.

Because the Plaintiff did not mention his current political conviction and his current anti-Taliban religious belief when applying for international protection he is not entitled to a refugee sur place status. 

As a result of six convictions owing to trivial offences against property, subsidiary protection was withdrawn from the Applicant, as he would represent a danger to the general public. The Constitutional Court revoked this decision as unconstitutional: the Asylum Court had not interpreted the corresponding national stipulation in accordance with the Directives as the crimes committed were not of the seriousness required in Art 17 Qualification Directive.

The Court quashed a country guidance decision on the application of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive in Iraq because the Tribunal had not considered what was necessary to ensure that it heard proper argument in a case designed to give binding guidance for other applicants.