Case summaries

A foreigner shall cease to be eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no longer required. The relevant provision refers to two separate reasons that justify revoking subsidiary protection. The first is that the circumstances which led to the granting of such protection have ceased to exist. The second is that those circumstances have changed, although the change of circumstances must be of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the foreigner no longer faces a real risk of serious harm.

Subsidiary protection cannot establish a right that is comparable to, for instance, the right to obtain permission for temporary stay or indefinite leave to remain.

Recalling the direct applicability of the Qualification Directive (Article 28, 29, recital 34), the Labour and Social Court of Vienna held that the refusal of a care allowance for beneficiaries of subsidary protection status was unlawful. The (minimum) core benefits to be granted to beneficiaries of subsidary protection status are to include at least support in the event of illness, whereby in accordance with Community law, the Austrian care allowance represented such support in the event of illness.

In the present case certain formal conditions for dismissing the application through an accelerated procedure as defined in Article 54 of International Protection Act (ZMZ) were not taken into account. The Ministry of the Internal (MI) did not take a stance as regards the circumstances that the Applicant claimed as the grounds for leaving his country of origin and applying for international protection.

Granting subsidiary protection is not dependent on the personal situation of the Applicant and relates to a generalised situation of serious risk in the country of origin, a situation that could commence even after the Applicant has left his country of origin. In the case in point, the indiscriminate violence throughout Nigeria fulfils the conditions required for granting subsidiary protection.

The Applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan minor, stated that he had left his home country owing to his abduction and the threat of sexual abuse by the local ruler. The right to a decision by the statutory judge was violated by the fact that the decision on the application for international protection was made by a court panel consisting of two judges, one male and one female.

Based solely on a 2012 UNHCR report, subsidiary protection was granted to the applicant as an individual risk to his life was recognised.

In order to determine whether an Applicant is exposed to a significant, specific risk stemming from an armed conflict, reference should be made to the actual target location of the foreign national upon return in the case of a localised armed conflict. This is often the region of origin of the Applicant. If the region of origin cannot be considered as the target location due to the risk facing the claimant, the latter may only be referred to another region in the country subject to the requirements of Article 8 of the Qualification Directive.

With regard to the evaluation as to whether extraordinary circumstances exist which do not come under the direct responsibility of the target deportation state and which prohibit the deporting state from deporting the foreign national according to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, reference should be made to the target deportation state as a whole in order to verify whether these circumstances exist in the location in which the deportation ends. 

In the case of individuals who are eligible for subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the limitation of residence represents an unauthorised limitation on the free movement of persons according to Article 32 of the Qualification Directive if it is based solely on social welfare grounds.  

It is the duty of the administrative body to deal reasonably with objections to intrusion into the private and family life of the applicant within international protection proceedings.

This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.

However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.

The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.

The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.