Case summaries
If a subsequent asylum application is based on circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision, refugee status shall not be granted if the applicant was able to develop his own political conviction at the time of the (termination of the) preceding asylum procedure. This can be assumed to be the case at the age of 16, or at the age of 18 at the latest.
This case concerned subsequent applications and previous findings. The CALL ruled that, when deciding on a subsequent application, it is not competent to re-judge issues that have been decided in earlier applications. The CALL confirmed that those issues are final, unless evidence is submitted that is of such a nature that it demonstrates in a certain manner that those earlier decisions would have been different had that evidence been submitted at that time.
The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.
This case concerned the submission of evidence for a subsequent asylum application where that evidence could have been submitted in support of the initial application.
It was held that since the applicant could already have produced that evidence in his initial asylum application, the reliance on that evidence could not now be considered as evidence relating to new facts and circumstances that could be relied upon to successfully substantiate a subsequent asylum application. Further, the domestic provision of Art 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act was not found to be contrary to Art 32 and 34 of the Procedures Directive.
If a subsequent application is based on “post-flight reasons” created by the applicant, he has to provide good reasons why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities.
As a rule, “post-flight reasons” which have been created by the applicant following the termination of an asylum procedure are not relevant for granting refugee status. An exception to this rule may be given if the activities which the applicant engaged in since he left the country of origin constitute a continuation of convictions which have been practiced before. However, activities which fulfil these criteria are not by themselves sufficient to constitute an exception to the rule. In addition the applicant has to provide good reasons to explain why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities after an unsuccessful earlier asylum application.
The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:
- A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
- The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.
The applicant, a lesbian from Iran, was recognised as a refugee. The court found:
- It is unreasonable for homosexuals to refrain from sexual activities in order to avoid persecution.
Although there is no systematic persecution of homosexuals in Iran, there is a considerable risk of detection and persecution.
The security and humanitarian situation in Kabul does not meet the standards for a “situation of extreme risk” (extreme Gefahrenlage) for a returnee who grew up in Kabul. Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that a particular risk resulting from an armed conflict is substantiated.
This case concerned the procedure for considering new evidence in subsequent asylum applications. The CALL found that the Immigration Department had not assessed whether a submitted document constituted a new element or not, but had instead decided that the document would not result in a determination of the existence of serious indications of a well-founded fear of persecution. In doing so, it was found that the Immigration Department had acted unlawfully (Art 51/8 of the Belgian Aliens Law).
New assessments and guidance from UNHCR regarding protection grounds and the possibility of internal protection are such "new circumstance" as referred to in Chapter 12 § 19 of the Aliens Act.
A recent UNHCR's report showing that the situation in Sri Lanka had significantly deteriorated for the group to which the applicant belonged was such a new factor and was likely to constitute a permanent obstacle to enforcement under Chapter 12. 1, 2 or 3 § and therefore a new assessment was granted.