Case summaries

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

A subsequent application for asylum, when there is a legally enforceable expulsion order, must be examined even if a stay on expulsion has been requested by the European Court of Human Rights according to Rule 39.

When protection grounds are invoked only after a decision on removal becomes final, these shall be deemed admissible. On any appeal, the  Migration Court or the Migration Court of Appeal cannot take into account such factors that could be the basis for granting a residence permit unless (for example, family links or humanitarian reasons) they are based on protection grounds. 

A mother of two children was recognised as a refugee as there was sufficient probability of her being forced to undergo sterilisation in China due to violation of the one child policy. Forced sterilisation constitutes a violation of the basic human right to physical integrity and human dignity to such an extent that it is without doubt relevant under Section 60 (1) of the Residence Act. / Art 1 A 2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner to refuse to process the asylum applications of two nationals of Azerbaijan, with refugee status in Poland. The applicants claimed they were being watched by Azeri agents in Poland and felt unsafe there. The Court held that the applicants would have had to show that the Polish authorities were unwilling or unable to provide protection. In circumstances where they had not even reported their fears to the Polish authorities, the applications were bound to fail. The Minister had no jurisdiction to grant them refugee status pursuant to the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Refugee Act, 1996.

The withdrawal of practical protection against deportation for subsequent applications is lawful and does not represent an infringement of the right to an effective remedy (Art 13 ECHR), if the legality of the withdrawal is examined by the Asylum Court.

The case concerned a subsequent application for international protection based on the right to a family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) The application was rejected as inadmissible by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on the basis that Art 8 considerations were deemed not applicable in asylum cases. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) made two important findings. Firstly it held that even if an application was considered to be inadmissible, there was an obligation to evaluate the risk of refoulement under Art 33 of 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, as provided by § 14(a)(2)(d) of the Asylum Act, in exceptional cases, to grant international protection for family life reasons, these have to be accepted as new elements in subsequent proceedings.

In this case, the Austrian Asylum Court held the decision of the Federal Asylum Office not to grant refugee status to the applicant’s child was a violation of Austrian asylum law since the child’s father had been granted refugee status. The Court also held a separation of the newborn child from its mother violates Art 8 ECHR and, therefore, the applicant’s asylum application has to be admitted to the procedure on the merits.