Case summaries
A serious and individual threat to life and limb may result from a general risk in the context of an armed conflict if the risk is enhanced because of the applicant’s individual circumstances or from an extraordinary situation which is characterised by such a high degree of risk that practically any civilian would be exposed to a serious and individual threat simply by his or her presence in the affected region.
The requirement of an individualisation of the threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is inversely proportional to the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises the armed conflict.
In this case the Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive applying the decision of the CJEU in Elgafaji (C-465/07; 17 February, 2009).
The case concerned an application for international protection by an Iraqi national. The application was dismissed on the grounds of a failure to establish that his life or person was threatened by reason of indiscriminate violence. The applicant failed to demonstrate individual risk.
This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.
The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.
The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).
The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:
- A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
- The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.
Examining the application as manifestly unfounded requires a three-stage test: (1) whether there is a risk of expulsion abroad or extradition of the person, (2) whether the Applicant could have filed the application sooner, (3) whether it is obvious from the steps taken by the Applicant that they had filed the application with the sole intention of avoiding imminent expulsion or extradition.
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not have, for instance, extraterritorial effect in comparison with Articles 3 and 8 of the same Convention. The return of an individual to a country where he is threatened with constraints on his religious freedom, which do not reach the level of interference with his rights pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, is not in contradiction with the Convention. Such a return cannot even represent prima facie serious harm for the purpose of examining subsidiary protection.
The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.