Case summaries

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.

The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.

The applicant based her claim for asylum on the threats and human rights violations arising as a result of her common-law husband’s political activities and the authorities’ suspicion of the applicant’s support of the opposition party. Refugee status was refused. The Administrative Court found that the applicant had failed to establish a risk of persecution based on her imputed political opinion. The Administrative Court held, that to return the applicant to her country of origin where she has experienced serious human rights violations, in the final stages of pregnancy or with a newborn child, without any social networks to fall back on, taken into account together, would form a real threat of serious harm suffering inhuman or degrading treatment as laid out in Art 88 of the Aliens Act.

The applicant, being a young, single man and fit for work, is at no substantial individual risk, neither in his home province Parwan nor in Kabul. Therefore, it can remain undecided if the conflict in Afghanistan constitutes an internal armed conflict. 

The case considered whether the security situation in central-Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, met the prerequisites for granting a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. It was confirmed that the need for international protection must be evaluated not only on points of law but also on points of fact. Both the applicant’s account of prior events in the country of origin, as well as current country of origin information regarding the security situation, must be taken into account in the risk assessment. As such, the evaluation is tied to a particular individual and to a particular time and place.

Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.

The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)

Even if it is assumed that an internal armed conflict is taking place, a serious individual risk can only be established if the degree of indiscriminate violence which is characteristic of the conflict has reached such a high level that any civilian is at risk of a serious individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.

The suicide attacks and bombings typical of Iraq and also of the hometown of the applicants can be classified as acts of indiscriminate violence. However, a density of danger as it is necessary for the assumption of a serious and individual risk cannot be established. Nor do the applicants possess individual characteristics which result in an increased risk for them when compared to other members of the civilian population.

The facilitated standard of proof under Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive may be applied to the examination of subsidiary protection. Under German law, subsidiary protection is not excluded on the ground that the applicant is a “danger to the community”.