Case summaries

The Supreme Court does not consider an assessment of the Applicant as an untrustworthy person to be justifiable where it is based only on the fact that he failed to mention all of the details of the case immediately in the admission interview, providing them gradually instead, as the Applicant‘s claims are logical, consistent, and in line with the situation in the country of origin. The argument of untrustworthiness can be used only in situations where there are additional factors indicating that the facts asserted by the Applicant are not true, and that has not been demonstrated in the case in question.

Young Nigerian women, especially those coming from the region of Benin City (State of Edo), who were forced to prostitute themselves in Europe in a transnational network of human trafficking, and who managed to extricate themselves from this network and to stop this forced activity, should not be seen as members of a particular social group in Nigeria. However, they face inhuman or degrading treatment in case of return to their country of origin and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.

The applicant claimed that he would face persecution if returned to Bangladesh due to his Ahmadi (Ahmadiyya) religion. Both the applicant’s father and brother were attacked because of their religion. The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected the application stating that effective protection is accessible within Bangladesh. The Court accepted the OIN’s reasoning. The prohibition of refoulement did not apply.

The applicant claimed asylum in November 2009 alleging a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race and religion. The application was refused by the Ministry of Interior on the grounds that the application did not amount to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. On appeal, the High National Court re-examined the application and held that the conflict which had arisen in the Ivory Coast had to be taken into account and on that basis subsidiary protection should be granted.

Refugee status was granted to the applicants (parents) because of their advocacy in Afghanistan for democracy, separation of state and religion, equality between men and women, and their membership of and support for the party “Comprehensive movement for democracy and progress in Afghanistan”. Refugee status was granted to their children because of their membership of a particular social group of “family”.

Threats by political opponents are to be considered as imminent persecution by non-State actors according to Art. 60 (1) sentence 4 (c) of the Residence Act in conjunction with Art. 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive. The Afghan State is unwilling and unable to grant protection against such persecution by non-State actors (Art 7 of the Qualification Directive).

The Court held that the question of whether discrimination, taken cumulatively, amounts to persecution in a given case is a matter for the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.

This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on  membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.

It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.

The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.

The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.

The guidance in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) should be applied, by analogy, in cases where the applicant feared persecution on account of their religion. Consequently, the Tribunal had to consider the reason why an Ahmadi applicant for asylum had modified his behaviour by preaching only to people who would not put him at risk of persecution.

The applicant was recognised as a refugee because of a threat of forced marriage in Afghanistan. The court found that rights violations resulting from forced marriage, including the use of physical and psychological violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights according to Art. 9 (1) (b) of the Qualification Directive. The applicant belonged to the particular social group of "unmarried women from families whose traditional self-image demands a forced marriage." The Afghan State is neither willing nor able to protect women against persecution in case of forced marriage. Internal protection was not available to the applicant.

This case concerned the exclusion from refugee status of a former Baath party member. The fact that the applicant had previously held a position in the Iraqi military, was one of the Defence Minister's advisers and one of Saddam Hussein's closest men, was, on the evidence before the Court, considered insufficient to meet the requirements for exclusion from refugee status.