Case summaries

1. If an Iranian national is declined the opportunity to obtain a school-leaving certificate and attend a state school because of the refusal by Iranian authorities to issue him with identity papers, this constitutes a significant discriminatory administrative measure according to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Qualification Directive.

 
2. The right to suitable education corresponding to a child’s abilities is recognised as a human right according to international law.

The Applicant fled to Austria to be with her husband. She pleaded no reasons for fleeing such as problems of living as a woman in Afghanistan and the Federal Asylum Agency also made no investigations into this aspect. Only in the appeal were specific women’s issues raised. The Asylum Court decided that the Federal Asylum Agency was obliged to undertake the appropriate investigations under apparent theoretical circumstances relevant to asylum (such as gender), even if the party did not initiate such a submission. 

Appeal against the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order's negative decision no 95/52986 of 28.4.2006 on a claim for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 & 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010 and the Minister of Citizen Protection's decision 5401/3-505533 of 7.11.2011 (385/8-11-2011 FEK YODD) pursuant to which the present Committee was formed.

This case involved a fear of persecution because of religious beliefs (atheism) as well as because of membership of a particular social group (personality shaped in a non-Islamic society / westernisation). In particular, the Committee ruled that if the Applicant were to return to Afghanistan now or in the near future, because of his atheism and the consequent non-conformity with the Islamic way of life of the society into which he would need to integrate, in conjunction with the fact that his personality has been shaped in a non-Islamic society with customs and a way of life totally different from those of Muslims, he would be reasonably likely to suffer aggressive social attitudes, threats and social exclusion which, taken cumulatively, could amount to persecution. Besides, should he return to a small rural community in Afghanistan – given the Applicant's particular personality and how it had been shaped – it is very likely that he would not be able to conceal his religious beliefs (atheism) and thus there was a reasonable chance that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution because of his atheism and his 'apostasy' from Islam (prosecution which is reasonably likely to lead to imprisonment or execution). This, however, would constitute a direct and severe violation of his fundamental right to religious freedom, especially in the context of the specific social, religious and political unrest and the absence of legal guarantees in the Applicant's country of origin.

It was held that even if he were not criminally prosecuted, the Applicant would, in any case, be at risk of suffering harm from non-state actors in the form of persecution; and that the Afghan State, police and other authorities were incapable of providing adequate and effective protection, mainly because of the lack of organisation and the corruption which prevails at all levels.

In assessing a claim for asylum, the Tribunal erred in concluding that the discrimination likely to be faced by the minor applicant (as an Ashkali) in receiving an education in Serbia did not rise to the level of persecution, particularly given the importance of the right to education in availing of other human rights.

Subsidiary protection was granted to a Roma of Serbian nationality who originated from Kosovo as the Court considered that he would currently face a risk of treatment contrary to human dignity in case of return to Serbia or to Kosovo.

Refugee status was granted to a Kosovar family of Roma origin based on their ethnicity being recognised as a particular social group. The court found that they faced a risk of persecution and that state protection was either unavailable or ineffective.

An applicant from Somalia was eligible for refugee status. The court found:

1. There was sufficient probability that the applicant’s life and freedom, in case of return to Somalia, were at risk due to his membership of a particular social group.
2. Clan membership constitutes a particular social group.
3. Protection against persecution is not provided by the State, by parties or by other organisations in Somalia.
4. There is no internal protection in Somalia.

The case concerned the interested party's obligation to cite specific facts which can provide evidence that the conditions for falling within the scope of the 1951 Convention had been satisfied. There must be a thorough examination of the main claims and a full justification of any negative decision in the case. If the Minister for Public Order adopts the Committee's negative judgment, then the relevant document must cite not only the interested party's claims but also the questions which were put to the foreigner and the responses he gave. The contested order – based on a defective opinion – referred in general terms to the Applicant not having shown a risk of persecution on racial, political or other grounds, and is deficiently reasoned. The application for annulment was granted.

The Tribunal considered an appeal which raised issues relating to when the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, including the circumstances in which the refusal by the State of nationality to provide documents to allow the applicant to be re-admitted constitutes persecution. It held that these were matters within its jurisdiction and the question of whether a national of a State has been lawfully or unlawfully deprived of that nationality was a legitimate issue to be considered in deciding upon a claim for international protection. Whether arbitrary deprivation of nationality amounts to persecution is a question of fact. The same is true of the denial of the right of return as a national; although in practice it is likely that such a denial will be found to be persecutory.

The Court held that the question of whether discrimination, taken cumulatively, amounts to persecution in a given case is a matter for the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.