Case summaries

The case concerned a woman who feared return to Sierra Leone because she would face gender specific persecution in the form of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  The issue was whether she was entitled to recognition as a refugee because she feared persecution on account of her membership of a particular social group.  Her appeal was allowed on the basis that women in Sierra Leone and, alternatively, uninitiated women who had not been subjected to FGM in Sierra Leone, were particular social groups.

The case concerned the issue of whether ‘family’ constitutes a particular social group. The applicant was recognised as a refugee on the basis of her well founded fear of persecution as a member of her husband’s family.

The sexual orientation of the Applicant for asylum may, depending on circumstances and with regard to the situation in the country of origin, be considered a sign of his membership of a particular social group. The threat of injury to the Applicant for asylum as a result of actions causing psychological pressure may not be as serious as injuries that result in threats to life or freedom, but must be at least of a comparable type.

Rejection of an extradition request by Azerbaijan in a case where the wanted person had been recognised as a refugee by Germany. Azerbaijan's request for extradition because of acts contrary to common criminal law was a premise aimed at stifling the wanted person's political opposition to the extraditing country's government. Azerbaijan was requesting extradition for political reasons.

Belonging to a group of people without power or influence does not constitute a particular social group and therefore cannot be deemed a convention ground for persecution under the Refugee Convention. 

The Court of Appeal gave guidance on the relevant factors to consider in assessing claims for protection against persecution from non-state actors under the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the ECHR.

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide protection in respect of claims of conscientious objectors who feared imprisonment for their refusal to undertake military service where there is no alternative service offered in national law. This was the position even if that objection is to all forms of military service and is absolute. The right to conscientious objection was not yet protected in international human rights law and was yet to emerge as a principle of customary international law. A claim may succeed if the applicant would be required, in the course of military service, to conduct military action that breached the basic rules of human conduct or if the punishment they would receive for refusal to serve was discriminatory or disproportionate. Secondly, when assessing whether persecution was “for” a Convention reason the decision-maker should ask the question of “what was the real reason for the persecution?”. The decision-maker should not limit the enquiry to the persecutor’s motivation but should look for the effective reason or reasons.

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

Where the actors of persecution feared are themselves state agents consideration must still be given to whether the applicant can avail himself of protection, but this assessment must be made in context. There will be a spectrum of cases between, on the one extreme, those where the only ill-treatment is by non-state actors and, on the other extreme, those where the state itself is wholly complicit in the ill-treatment.

Applicant complained under Articles 2, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention in relation to the death of her partner while in police custody.