Case summaries

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

The CALL held that the fact the Applicant had already suffered very severe genital mutilation (type III – infibulation) was a serious indicator of a well-founded fear of persecution due to her membership of a particular social group. 

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin.  The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country.  The Administrative Court was ordered  to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.