Case summaries

There is a real risk that by virtue of his predicted employment in the media sector the Appellant will be persecuted for political opinion and/or that a breach of his rights under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR will occur.

The Appellant is not to be denied refugee status on the ground that it would be open to him to seek to engage in employment other than in the journalistic or media sector.

Considering the general situation in the country and the circumstances specific to the Applicant, the ECtHR held that there were no serious and current grounds to believe that she would be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 upon her return to Nigeria. 

In light of a deterioration of safety conditions in Iraq since June 10th 2014 members of the Yazidi religious group living in the province of Ninive (Mosul) are in danger of persecution solely on the basis of their religious beliefs, from which they can’t reasonably seek effective protection from the Iraqi state nor from any other organization, which could offer protection. Furthermore they can’t now, nor will they for the foreseeable future be able to evade persecution by seeking refuge in safe havens within country boarders.

It is impossible to advise the Applicant to request the protection of public bodies in a situation in which the public bodies obviously discriminate against a certain religious group. When examining the alternative option of internal relocation, it is necessary to assess the legal and factual availability in terms of the circumstances of the Applicant. It is impossible to build the protection proceedings on a testimony with partial inaccuracies and to revert to translated reports provided by the Applicant.

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

The CALL held that the fact the Applicant had already suffered very severe genital mutilation (type III – infibulation) was a serious indicator of a well-founded fear of persecution due to her membership of a particular social group. 

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.