Case summaries

The case examined the allegations of five Afghan nationals that their detention conditions in Pagani detention centre were in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, that they did not have access to an effective remedy (Article 13) and that they were deprived of their liberty and security as well as of their right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided speedily by a Court (Article 5 para 4). 

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the expulsion of an Algerian national from Slovakia to Algeria, in contempt of an interim measure issued by the Court, was in violation of Articles 3, 13 and 34 of the Convention.

The Helsinki Supreme Administrative Court decided  that Finland cannot return an Iraqi asylum seeker to Sweden, where he/she faces the risk of being sent back to Baghdad and may be subjected to violations of his/her human rights. The  Supreme Administrative Courtdecided that the ruling of the Finnish Immigration Service had to be reversed and the application for asylum had to be substantively examined in Finland. 

A single woman with two illegitimate children from relationships not approved of by the family (who are Muslim) may be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the country of origin by the members of her family.

The particular social group within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees is the group comprising single mothers of illegitimate children living in Muslim families and societies.

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an applicant to Hungary, when that applicant had first entered the EU through Greece. The argument that Greece’s formal responsibility for the applicant was “interrupted” by the applicant leaving the EU for a short term is contrary to Art 16(3) Dublin Regulation and must be dealt with by initiating procedures for a preliminary ruling at the CJEU. A preliminary ruling should also address the systemic failure of the asylum system in Greece, the risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR and whether this results in a different Member State being responsible for the asylum procedure.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.