Case summaries

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an applicant to Hungary, when that applicant had first entered the EU through Greece. The argument that Greece’s formal responsibility for the applicant was “interrupted” by the applicant leaving the EU for a short term is contrary to Art 16(3) Dublin Regulation and must be dealt with by initiating procedures for a preliminary ruling at the CJEU. A preliminary ruling should also address the systemic failure of the asylum system in Greece, the risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR and whether this results in a different Member State being responsible for the asylum procedure.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The case concerns a recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom, who was to be deported in the interests of national security to Jordan. The UK Government obtained assurances from Jordan that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment and would be tried fairly by the Jordanian State Security Court. However the applicant alleged that, if deported to Jordan, he would be at real risk of ill-treatment and an unfair trial.

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.

This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

The detention of asylum applicants may undermine their ability to claim asylum and that an ‘effective remedy’ requires an appeal with suspensive effect against refoulement in order to prevent irreparable harm, sufficient time to prepare the appeal and effective legal assistance and interpretation.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.