Case summaries

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

This case examined the denial of a minor’s application for asylum which was decided primarily on the failure of his mother’s application. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal did not consider Country of Origin Information (COI) from the child’s perspective. Furthermore, clear reasons were not given for the refusal decision. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Refugee Appeals Tribunals decision to deny refugee status to the child. The Court also held that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration of the Tribunal both with regard to the procedure and substantive consideration of appeal. 

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider every possible breach of Art. 3 ECHR (or Art. 4 CFREU respectively) when examining a Dublin transfer. A possible breach can be linked to personal circumstances of the asylum seeker and does not necessarily have to be caused by a systemic failure of the asylum system in the receiving country. A Dublin transfer is forbidden if there is a real risk of a breach of Art. 3 ECHR.

A single mother and her five minor children must be considered as particularly vulnerable and cannot be transferred from Austria to Hungary.

If an appellant provides substantiated reasons that call into question the consideration of evidence in the administrative proceedings, the facts cannot be regarded as “well established on basis of the records in combination with the complaint”. Thus, an oral hearing has to be held. The same applies if there is a necessity to consider up-to-date country of origin information as well as an up-to-date medical report due to the long duration of the judicial proceedings.

In the opinion of the court, the absence of a legal representative in the oral hearing, in spite of an explicit request by the appellant, does not constitute a grave violation of procedural rules. The relevant provisions does not provide for any legal consequences for such failure to act. However, this interpretation is not mandatory due to the lack of explicitly regulated legal consequences and requires further clarification by the Supreme Administrative Court. 

The statement that the applicant can relocate within his country of origin is based solely on general information on Ukraine, without paying attention to his personal circumstances and conditions in the places he could be expected to settle in.

In the decision there is no reference to the applicant’s age, occupation, family situation, employment and housing opportunities, as well as his registration and the level of assistance he could benefit from if returned. The burden of proof to show that the personal circumstances of the applicant are not sufficient to counter a refusal of international protection on the basis of the internal protection alternative lies with the State authority.

The main question is whether the applicant can be sure that he will obtain assistance allowing for certain standards of living. The state assistance is significant here, as the applicant has no family or friends in the part of the country of origin under control of Ukrainians.

General situation in the country of origin, however difficult, does not justify granting refugee status, if there is no or only some small risk of persecutions (such risk can never be actually eliminated). However the authority is obliged to individually assess the situation of a particular applicant. This is not possible without careful examination of all the letters submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before the first and the second instance. Failure to do this cannot be validated by the Court by determining the facts on its own, since it would lead to de facto depriving the applicant of his right to have the case examined in two administrative instances.

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

The first subparagraph of Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive allows the imposition of integration measures of Third Country Nationals in principle. However the general principle of proportionality requires integration measures to actually fulfil the objective of integrating TCNs and not delimiting the possibility of family reunion.

Member States must therefore consider the individual circumstances of the applicant which can lead to dispensing with the integration exam where family reunification would otherwise be excessively difficult.

The Administrative Court judged that a full and rigorous examination of the consequences of transferring the applicant back to Italy is required, given the delicate and evolving situation in the country. As this was not done the prefecture’s decision to refuse to examine the asylum application and send her back to Italy was annulled. The case was remitted to the prefecture for re-examination. 

This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.

The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy.