Case summaries
The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Bulgaria, and also overturned the placement of the Applicant in administrative detention for five days.
The court held that given the general state of reception conditions for asylum applicants in Bulgaria and the Applicant’s particular circumstances, in particular his physical vulnerability, there were substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for asylum applicants and that if the Applicant was handed over to Bulgarian authorities, his asylum application would not be properly examined or he would be at risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and paragraph 2 of article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”).
The Federal Administrative Court rules, that the significant risk of absconding for ‘Dublin-detention’ orders must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The sole existence of a ground for detention as set out in Art. 76a(2) AuG does not automatically indicate a significant risk absconding. Such an order is unlawful and must be rescinded. The Court ‘warns’ the SEM that the current practices are very concerning and require adaptation.
The judgment examined whether returns of asylum seekers to Bulgaria would be contrary to their Article 3 rights. The court held that the Bulgarian system has significantly improved since the UNHCR report in 2014 which prohibited returns of asylum seekers. As a result the returns would not be in breach of Article 3.
The mere fact that the applicant does not have an identity document does not mean that there was a reason for limiting his freedom of movement based on the first alinea of Article 51(1) of IPA (establishment of identity). The mere presumption that the applicant has deliberately thrown the passport away in order to conceal his identity and country of origin does not mean that doubts exists concerning the applicant’s identity. Doubts of the identity of applicants for international protection may exist for example if the applicants change their personal information during the procedure.
Detention of migrants for criminal offences subject to return is lawful even if asylum-seeker status is subsequently acquired. The application of 2008/115/EC is then not mandatory and the detention’s duration is not addressed under Article 5 (1)(f) therefore is to be judged ad hoc.
An asylum applicant can be sent to a Safe Third Country by a Member State who has admitted responsibility under Dublin III in the context of a take back request, where the applicant has left the responsible Member State before a decision on the first asylum application has been taken on its merits.
The absence of information being provided to the sending Member State by the receiving Member State on the latter’s legislation and practice regarding STC does not prevent an asylum applicant being sent to a STC or breach an applicant’s right to an effective remedy
Where an applicant has been taken back by a responsible Member State there is no obligation on the State to re-open the examination of the application at the exact point where it was left.
The appeal procedure dealt with the question of whether the complainant is to be classified as a minor according to Article 2 lit. g of the Dublin III Regulation, with the consequence that Article 8 para. 1 of the Dublin III Regulation is applicable and the complainant can therefore remain with her sister in Switzerland. In particular the term “legally present” and the procedure of taking evidence were discussed in depth.
The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims. A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court. The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.
The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR. The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.
Article 8(3)(e) of the recast Reception Conditions Directive fulfils the requirements of proportionality by virtue of the strictly circumscribed framework regulating its use. In light of Article 52(3) of the Charter, Article 8(3)(e) therefore complies with Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.
The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 3 in relation to detention conditions at Tychero. There was no violation of Article 5(1) insofar as the detention was not arbitrary and was in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, but there was a violation of Article 5(4) in relation to the ineffectiveness of the judicial review of detention conditions. Further, there was a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3, because the Greek authorities had deported the Applicant to Turkey, without verifying whether his asylum claim was still pending.