Case summaries

The competent authority has to respect as legally binding a court order that determines a certain date of birth and thereby the minority of an applicant. This is also the case if the applicant himself indicates another (earlier) date of birth.

The personal interview of a minor without his legal representative constitutes a significant procedural violation. The facts are presumed to not be ascertained. The competent authority has to ascertain the facts and circumstances once again. 

Family unity and the best interests of the child are high priorities when applying the Dublin III Regulation.  A child who has applied for international protection in Germany but has members of his family in Greece is entitled to family unity with them in Germany. The Dublin III Regulation specifies that this transfer should be carried out within six months of a Member State’s acceptance of the take charge or take back request. The time period to transfer starts from the Member State’s acceptance of the request. The right of the asylum seeker to be transferred within said time-limit is a subjective right. Whilst Germany had accepted the take charge request they had only planned to transfer the applicants at a time after the six month deadline. An interim injunction was therefore necessary in order to ensure that the rights of the applicant were respected. 

The right to be heard entails the obligation of the court to take note of the arguments put forward by the parties and to take these arguments into consideration when taking its decision. While this does not require the court to explicitly address every single fact put forward by the parties, the grounds of the decision have to refer to the essential issues raised by such facts.

In case of a single mother and her four minor children facing deportation to a country where beneficiaries of international protection had to live under difficult conditions, these personal circumstances of the applicants are of key importance to the legal evaluation. Independently of the question, whether deportations to Bulgaria were, in light of the current conditions, generally permissible, the provisions of Art. 21 et seqq. of the Reception Conditions Directive clearly stipulated that the concerns of families with children had to be given particular consideration.

Consequently, under such circumstances a court was required to specifically set out why it assumed that the family would be guaranteed suitable accommodation that excluded the possibility of health risks and met the needs of a family with children. Otherwise, the decision amounts to an infringement of the applicant’s right to be heard under Art. 103 (1) of the Basic Law.

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

Article 17 forms an integral part of the Dublin Regulation and should be applied in a manner which furthers the aims and objectives of the Regulation in general. Article 17 is a justiciable right and should be particularly relied upon in circumstances where one of the overarching values of the Dublin Regulation, namely expedition, is not being fulfilled in the procedures of the host Member State. Article 17 is not subject to a prior assessment of non-satisfaction of Article 8 (family reunification) of that same Regulation.

Applicants who engaged with Dublin authorities should be subjected to less onerous standards when assessing the success of an Article 8 ECHR claim.

The UK Upper Tribunal held that there had been a failure of the Secretary of State to lawfully exercise the discretion conferred by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation and ordered the Secretary of State to admit the applicant to the UK, based on: (1) the deficiencies of the Italian asylum system in the present case, namely the lack of sufficient expedition to register the asylum application and initiate Dublin proceedings; (2) the deficiencies and delay in the guardianship system in Italy; (3) the expected lengthy procedures for a “take charge” request and subsequent Dublin transfer; (4) the need to take into account the best interests of children.

Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.

If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.

It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.

Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.

This case primarily dealt with the lawfulness of a prolonged period of detention in the context of whether there was a reasonable prospect of deportation and also of evidence of both current mental illness and previous torture and trafficking.

In some cases of severe illness Art. 3 ECHR precludes a deportation even though a treatment in the state of origin is possible. If the appellant cannot bear the costs of the treatment or the necessary concomitant medication the renewed increase of the illness and therefore a real life-threatening risk is probable which precludes the deportation of the applicant. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that to send a refugee who has a residence permit in Italy and an asylum seeker back to the country would not violate Article 3 ECHR.

The court further constrained the decision in Tarakhel to families with minor children. 

A Dublin Transfer to Italy should be prevented when the person concerned is a vulnerable person as per in Article 3 (2) Dublin III Regulation.