Case summaries
Foreign asylum seekers without employment have a right to be exempted from the payment of health care contributions under Art. 8(16) of Law No. 537/1993, irrespective of whether they are seeking a job for the first time or have worked in the past. The entitlement to this benefit depends solely on the condition of “non-employment” under Art. 19(1), (2) and (7) of Legislative Decree 150/2015 and to the declaration by the non-employed individual of their availability to work. Denying this benefit to jobless asylum seekers amounts to discrimination.
The ECtHR ruled that there had not been a violation of Article 5(1) ECHR in the applicant’s detention at the VIAL hotspot, a day after the entry into force of the EU-Turkey Statement. It also ruled that the threshold of severity required for their detention conditions to be considered as inhuman or degrading treatment had not been reached.
However, the ECtHR found that Greece violated the applicant’s rights under Article 5(2) by not providing them with detailed, understandable information about the reasons for their detention and the remedies available to them.
To not allow young adults who have been refused asylum to terminate their studies deprives Article 8 ECHR of all weight, an Article which protects an individual’s professional training and personal development. Even if the right to stay of a student is not protected by Article 8, the termination of a qualifying training which is on the horizon falls under the scope of private life within the ECHR. Therefore, the transfer of the applicant to a return centre would prevent her from finishing her schooling, ruining her 7 years of studies and would constitute a harm difficult to repair.
The decision of the Administrative Court of Düsseldorf prohibits a Dublin transfer of an asylum seeker from Germany to Greece stating that there are substantial grounds for believing that systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Greece could put the applicant at risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
A lack of the State authorities’ fulfilment of obligations under article L.223-2 of the Code of Social Action and Families can create serious harm to a fundamental right.
The obligation by the applicant to put in place emergency accommodation is reinforced when a child’s health, security or morality is put in danger.
This case dealt with the issue that arose from the dissenting judgement of Judge Hogan in the case at the Court of Appeal – that is whether the Irish legislative provision preventing (without limitation) an asylum seeker from seeking, or entering, employment in the period before the final determination of his asylum claim was contrary to the right to work under the Irish Constitution and, if it was, to what extent could an asylum seeker claim the benefit of that right in the Constitution and to what extent could the State legitimately restrict that right.
Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.
If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.
It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.
Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.
This case concerned the back dating of child benefit for families who were previously in the asylum procedure.
The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta.
The principle of material continuity applies to the transition from one form of aid to another. A family who has been granted international protection should be accomodated in reception centers for refugees until they benefit from financial assistance and a stable private housing, even if it means extending the deadline to fins accommodation that had been given to them following their recognition as refugees.