Case summaries

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

In this case the applicants argued unsuccessfully that the decision of the UK designated authority for determining asylum claims (the Secretary of State for the Home Department) regarding an applicant’s age should be accepted by other government bodies.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains a finite list of grounds on which refugee status may be recognised and does not include victims of war, natural disasters, or famine, family situation, unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, or poverty.

The assessment of whether the foreignor's fear of persecution is justified must therefore be performed with reference to the individual case in question and in the light of the general social, legal, political, and economic situation of the country of origin of the foreignor applying for refugee status.

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

The CGRS (Office of the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons) may not dispute the nationality of an asylum seeker without taking into account the official documents that he has filed.

In a challenge to a decision to refuse subsidiary protection and humanitarian leave to remain, the Court considered the obligation on the decision maker to consider relevant documentation, the obligation to give reasons for a decision to dismiss such evidence, reliance by the Minister on credibility findings by the RAT in denying the earlier application for refugee status and whether an Applicant is required to challenge the RAT findings in a subsequent application for subsidiary protection. The Court found that the Minister had failed to weigh the apparently corroborative documentation against the marginal findings of lack of credibility by the RAT or to give reasons for dismissing or rejecting such documentation.

Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.

The Court granted permission to the Applicant to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African national. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ but because the appeal decision was based on personal credibility, the absence of an oral hearing may have been unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive.