Case summaries

Where an individual is detained with a view to his removal and an Article 3 violation is alleged if the applicant is returned, it is for the Court to rule on the plea and thus assess the lawfulness of the decision to detain.

In the light of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 3 ECHR and country of origin information on Sudan the Belgian authorities had to rigorously verify if the applicant would risk being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR before issuing the order to leave the territory, which includes giving the applicant an effective opportunity to be heard. This applies regardless of whether the applicant had applied for asylum or not. 

The complainant is an ethnic Galadi and a Muslim from Afgoye, Somalia. On 6 April 2017, the Danish Immigration Service decided not to prolong the complainant’s subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 11 (2), cf. Art. 19 (1) no. 1 and Art. 19 (7) cf. Art. 26 (1).

After an overall assessment of the country of origin information the Board found that a deportation of the complainant to Afgoye no longer constitutes a violation of Denmark’s international obligations including ECHR article 3. However, regarding the assessment under the Aliens Act article 26, the Board found that due to the applicant’s economic, linguistic and social integration the Immigration Service’s decision to end the applicant’s subsidiary protection was incorrect. Thus the Board decided to uphold his subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

Kabul cannot be considered as a reasonable internal flight alternative for the complainant due to the lack of a sustainable social network for him there and no other particular factors which would enable the applicant's removal . Therefore the complainant does not meet the requirements for a removal to Afghanistan.

The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.

Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed. 

1. Afghans who have worked for international aid organisations are particularly endangered of becoming victims of political persecution by non-state actors (e.g. Taliban) according to § 3 (1) AsylG in case of a return to Afghanistan.

2. There is no internal protection for these people. They cannot escape the clutches of non-state actors as these groups have a wide (information) network at their disposal and an increased interest in persons who have worked for international aid organisations.

The applicant is an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Bon Clan from Mesegawayn in the Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The applicant was originally in 2014 granted subsidiary protection by the Danish Immigration Service under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2). In February 2017, the Danish Immigration Service revoked the applicant’s subsidiary protection.

The account of the applicant regarding his original application was rejected by the Board due to a lack of credibility.

The majority of the Board found probable that the applicant’s daughter if returned to Somalia would be at risk of forced circumcision.

As the primary applicant, the child was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the cohabiting parents were granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) with reference to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1 (A) 2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, published on 22 December 2009 para. 9.

The claimant’s complaint against a decision denying an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court is dismissed. According to Article 132 (2) Number 1 of the Administrative Court Act, a legal question which is of fundamental significance is required for an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. The burden of proof to demonstrate this is on the claimant. The arguments of the claimant, especially a divergent judgement of the Bavarian Administrative Court dealing with similar facts, refer to questions of facts, which are reserved for the initial appeal court. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Sunni Muslim from Aleppo, Syria was granted temporary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (3).

A complaint to the Refugee Appeals Board was lodged claiming refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1), alternatively subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (2).

The applicants mother was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) due to her work in a health clinic treating injured insurgents.

The majority of the Board, referring to country of origin information, found that the applicant, as part of the mother’s household, if returned to Syria would be concretely and individually at risk of persecution.

The applicant thus fulfilled the conditions to be and was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).