Case summaries
The impossibility to proceed with an asylum applicant’s transfer to another Member State responsible for examining the asylum application is established once there is a clear and real risk for the interested party to be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatments within the meaning of articles 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), even in the absence of having serious reasons to believe there are systemic failures in the Member State’s asylum system.
The applicant appealed the Migration Court’s decision to dismiss his application for asylum on grounds of the availability of an internal protection alternative in the applicants home country of Afghanistan.
The Migration Court of Appeal granted the appeal as it was held that the question of internal protection can only be assessed after the court has made an individual assessment of the original grounds for protection invoked by the applicant.
The Court indicated interim measures (under Rule 39) to Russia after the order of removal of a Syrian national who applied for asylum after the expiry of his student visa. Subsequently, the applicant applied to the Court against the Russian Federation claiming that Russia had breached his rights under Articles 2, 3, 5(1)(f) and 5(4) of the Convention.
Prospective extradition of Applicants, members of an established vulnerable group under ECtHR, to a country where the risk of ill-treatment is real shall trigger a violation of Article 3 ECHR. Detention orders not meeting Article 5§1(f) ECHR objective threshold are and should be deemed as unlawful. The plurality of domestic remedies with the same objective does not prescribe their use by the Applicant for the purposes of Article 35§1 ECHR.
The Immigration and Asylum Office unlawfully rejected the claimant’s application for international protection. The court found that the authorities did not objectively assess the evidence and country information provided by the claimant, a Coptic Christian from Egypt. They also failed to correctly interpret the definition of a refugee in accordance with international law and disregarded the special status of the claimant who was an underage applicant.
Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed.
An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.
The applicant, an ethnic Ingush and a Muslim from Ingushetia, Russia, feared her former husband and his family. She feared they would take her daughter away from her because she ran away with her child. Moreover, the applicant feared her eldest brother as he would marry her off to an elderly man and take her child away and hand the child over to her former husband.
The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the conflicts between the applicant and her family members were of such nature and intensity to fall under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7. Consequently, the Board upheld the Danish Immigration Service’s decision to refuse the application.