Case summaries

The right to be heard entails the obligation of the court to take note of the arguments put forward by the parties and to take these arguments into consideration when taking its decision. While this does not require the court to explicitly address every single fact put forward by the parties, the grounds of the decision have to refer to the essential issues raised by such facts.

In case of a single mother and her four minor children facing deportation to a country where beneficiaries of international protection had to live under difficult conditions, these personal circumstances of the applicants are of key importance to the legal evaluation. Independently of the question, whether deportations to Bulgaria were, in light of the current conditions, generally permissible, the provisions of Art. 21 et seqq. of the Reception Conditions Directive clearly stipulated that the concerns of families with children had to be given particular consideration.

Consequently, under such circumstances a court was required to specifically set out why it assumed that the family would be guaranteed suitable accommodation that excluded the possibility of health risks and met the needs of a family with children. Otherwise, the decision amounts to an infringement of the applicant’s right to be heard under Art. 103 (1) of the Basic Law.

Both applicants seek legal assistance and to register their application for asylum, which was previously refused by the Alpes Maritimes Prefect. The interim relief judge decided that the Prefect’s refusal to provide the individuals with an application form to register their application for asylum, notwithstanding their presence within the territory and contact with the police, amounted to a serious breach of the right to asylum.  

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.

The Administrative Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court decides on the inadmissibility of the appeal an applicant for international protection submitted of a judgement that denied him the right of asylum and subsidiary protection.

The Supreme Court concludes there is no legal reasoning to admit the appeal, because what the National Court concluded was well-founded.

A renewed application for asylum in a second country is admissible if the nature of international protection applied for differs from the protection already granted. Deportation to the country of the first application or the country of origin is not to be taken into account in this situation.

A decision by the State Secretary for Security and Justice (the “State Secretary”) of the Netherlands will be in violation of: (i) Article 3.37e of the Foreigners Regulation 2000 if such decision, regarding whether a country qualifies as a safe third country, is not based on several information sources; and/or, (ii) Articles 3.2 and 3.46 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the basis that all decisions of the State Secretary are required to (a) be carefully prepared and (b) include a decisive motivation.

An application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 cannot be considered inadmissible because subsidiary protection has already been granted by another Member State (if the protection applied for is more favourable than the existing protection). The assessment of the admissibility of an application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 is subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted pursuant to the now superseded Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2005/85/EU) which provided for inadmissibility of an application for asylum if refugee status had already been granted by another Member State. 

The applicant requested international protection in Spain on 3rd November 2014, having been assaulted in his country of origin because of his sexual orientation. His partner died as a result of the assault. On the 26th October 2015, the Trial Chamber denied his request, stating that the allegations put forward by the applicant were “improbable or insufficient.”

On 18th July 2016, the applicant appealed this decision on two different grounds of appeal. First, on the grounds of an error when applying the relevant procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, mistaking the phase of admission for the phase of concession. And second, on the grounds that the Chamber’s interpretation of the evidence provided was restrictive.

The Chamber granted the appeal against the decision made on 26th October 2015 and this decision was ruled null and void.

The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:

Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”) 

i)  the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and

ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,

apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.

The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired.