Case summaries

Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.

The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children. 

The applicant is an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Bon Clan from Mesegawayn in the Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The applicant was originally in 2014 granted subsidiary protection by the Danish Immigration Service under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2). In February 2017, the Danish Immigration Service revoked the applicant’s subsidiary protection.

The account of the applicant regarding his original application was rejected by the Board due to a lack of credibility.

The majority of the Board found probable that the applicant’s daughter if returned to Somalia would be at risk of forced circumcision.

As the primary applicant, the child was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the cohabiting parents were granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) with reference to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1 (A) 2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, published on 22 December 2009 para. 9.

The applicant, an ethnic Turkman and an atheist from Aache, Afghanistan had received death threats from local residents close to the imam as well as from his own father because of his apostasy.

The Refugee Appeals Board found that the applicant because of his apostacy would be at risk of being persecuted by local residents, Afghan authorities and the Taleban. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

The claimant’s complaint against a decision denying an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court is dismissed. According to Article 132 (2) Number 1 of the Administrative Court Act, a legal question which is of fundamental significance is required for an onward appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. The burden of proof to demonstrate this is on the claimant. The arguments of the claimant, especially a divergent judgement of the Bavarian Administrative Court dealing with similar facts, refer to questions of facts, which are reserved for the initial appeal court. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Sunni Muslim from Aleppo, Syria was granted temporary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (3).

A complaint to the Refugee Appeals Board was lodged claiming refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1), alternatively subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (2).

The applicants mother was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) due to her work in a health clinic treating injured insurgents.

The majority of the Board, referring to country of origin information, found that the applicant, as part of the mother’s household, if returned to Syria would be concretely and individually at risk of persecution.

The applicant thus fulfilled the conditions to be and was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
 

Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department  that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters.  However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision. 

Judicial review to challenge the failure/refusal of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SoS”) to determine the application of the applicant’s spouse and two youngest children for family reunification in the UK on the following grounds: a failure to apply the SoS published policy; irrationality; breach of all the family members’ rights under Art. 8 ECHR; and (regarding the two children in the UK), breach of the duties owed under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”).

The Upper Tribunal found that:

1) the Home Office family reunification policy embraces a series of flexible possibilities for proof of identity;

2) the reunion applications were not examined and determined which involves a public law misdemeanour within the applicant’s grounds for challenge; and

3) in any case where withdrawal or a consent order is proposed judicial scrutiny and adjudication are required.

The fact that the membership of a particular social group is not subject to specific repressive criminal provisions has no incidence on the granting of refugee status.