Case summaries

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.

1. At present, a definition of what constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity has to be primarily based on the elements of these crimes as determined in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
2. In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.
3. As a rule, acts by combatants which form part of combat operations in an internal armed conflict, and which do not constitute crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity (under Section 3 II (1) (1) of the German Asylum Procedure Act), will also not constitute the exclusion ground of a serious non-political crime.

Internal protection has to be assessed in accordance with the Qualification Directive, and under very strict criteria. The possibility of relocating to another part of the country has to be available to the applicant and the protection has to be effective. 

Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive only offers protection in exceptional circumstances where there is a high level of indiscriminate violence.

This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:

1. A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
2. The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.

The security and humanitarian situation in Kabul does not meet the standards for a “situation of extreme risk” (extreme Gefahrenlage) for a returnee who grew up in Kabul. Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that a particular risk resulting from an armed conflict is substantiated.

The question as to whether or not an armed conflict existed has to be answered according to humanitarian law (common Art 3 of the Geneva Convention and the second additional protocol).