Case summaries

The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.

The applicant’s asylum application was rejected in Croatia and he received an order to leave the country in 30 days. The Slovenian Asylum authority detained the applicant due to the risk of absconding, because he left Croatia before receiving a decision in his asylum procedure. The Court ruled that the applicant’s departure from Croatia was incorrectly assessed as arbitrary absconding (the applicant actually respected the order to leave the country) and therefore the applicant does not present a risk of absconding. The Court also held that the measure was not necessary, that the Asylum authority incorrectly referred to its discretionary powers in this matter and that the objective criteria to determine when someone presents the risk of absconding (from Article 68 of Aliens Act-2) have not been applied.

The Constitutional Court rules that the doubts of the Federal Administrative Court about the legality of Section 9a(4) and Section 21(9) FPG-DVO as amended by BGBl. II 143/2015, which defines the term “risk of absconding” in the context of detention pending deportation pursuant to Section 76 FPG, are unfounded. The Court finds that Section 9a(4) FPG-DVO was adopted on a sufficient legal basis. 

In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.

Dublin III is characterised by the introduction or re-fortification of rights and mechanisms which guarantee the involvement of the asylum seeker in the determination process. Article 27(1) when read in conjunction with Recital 19 is ,therefore, to be interpreted as allowing an asylum seeker to appeal a transfer decision on grounds that the Chapter III allocation criteria were incorrectly applied.

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.

In the case of a claimant whose first asylum application would be viewed as being withdrawn by Bulgarian authorities, it cannot be ruled out that upon return to Bulgaria under a take back request the applicant would not be detained. In light of reported detention conditions the Secretary of State should have investigated the risk of a potential Article 3 violation if the applicant were to be returned to Bulgaria.  

The procedural dimension of Article 8 ECHR as well as the investigative and evidence gathering obligations on Member States within the Dublin III Regulation require the Secretary of State to proactively and expeditiously undertake steps to verify familial links. Passiveness in this regard will lead to an unlawful decision making procedure.  

The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:

Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”) 

i)  the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and

ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,

apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.

The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired. 

If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.

In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants.