Case summaries

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider every possible breach of Art. 3 ECHR (or Art. 4 CFREU respectively) when examining a Dublin transfer. A possible breach can be linked to personal circumstances of the asylum seeker and does not necessarily have to be caused by a systemic failure of the asylum system in the receiving country. A Dublin transfer is forbidden if there is a real risk of a breach of Art. 3 ECHR.

A single mother and her five minor children must be considered as particularly vulnerable and cannot be transferred from Austria to Hungary.

An application to establish the suspensive effect of a pending appeal pursuant to Section 80, Paragraph 5 of the German Code of Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung – VwGO) is not a legal remedy under Article 20, Paragraph 1 (d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”). A German court’s dismissal of a Section 80, Paragraph 5 application does therefore not suspend the 6-month deadline under Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Dublin II Regulation for a member state of the European Union (“Member State”) to transfer an applicant to a Member State that has accepted (actually or  implicitly) a request to take charge. 

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the removal of a Syrian national of Kurdish origin to Italy would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 and 8 of the Convention.

The Administrative Court judged that a full and rigorous examination of the consequences of transferring the applicant back to Italy is required, given the delicate and evolving situation in the country. As this was not done the prefecture’s decision to refuse to examine the asylum application and send her back to Italy was annulled. The case was remitted to the prefecture for re-examination. 

The procedural guarantee in Art. 4 of the Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 is mandatory. The guarantee concerns the asylum seekers right to information when they present an application for international protection.

This safeguard is not respected solely because the applicant has undergone a personal interview, he needs to be given the “Common Leaflet”. This aims at guaranteeing that the information has been delivered in a proper way and in a clear and objective manner.

The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.

An excessive length of the procedure (in this case 2 years and 5 months) for examining the jurisdiction for the application for international protection, which is not caused by the protection seeker himself, leads to an obligation of the Member State to decide the case itself (“duty of self-entry”). Thus this Member State has jurisdiction for the application for international protection to guarantee a fast and efficient procedure within the Dublin III-Regulation.

The court may reject the request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU when the provision is clear (acte clair), only if it checks that the clarity of the contested provision is equally obvious to the courts of other Member States and the CJEU, taking into account the characteristics of EU law and special problems posed by its interpretation, including a comparison of all language versions, respecting the specific terminology of EU law and the placement of the interpretation in the context of EU law.

The Constitutional Court annulled the contested judgment because of the infringement of the right to equal protection of rights in connection to the right to an effective remedy.