Case summaries
Limiting the possibility to access classified information to the third country national does not automatically mean that their right to an effective remedy with regard to a return order was infringed. By the same token there has been no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter.
The request for a preliminary ruling reads as follows: “Should Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code interpreted in light of Recital 29 of the preamble and Article 47 of the Charter be understood as creating an obligation for a Member State to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before a court?”
In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court the wording of Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code does not provide clarity as to whether the EU legislator intended to give the term “appeal” the meaning of any measure envisaged in national law or to give the right to an effective remedy before a respective court. If the CJEU, in the preliminary reference proceedings, states that the right to “appeal” should be exercised before a court, the national law excluding judicial control with regard to the Consulate’s decisions refusing the issuance of a visa would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.
The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.
The lower court had erred in law by judging that the administration need not justify having informed the applicant about the possibility to communicate with a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.
Dublin III is characterised by the introduction or re-fortification of rights and mechanisms which guarantee the involvement of the asylum seeker in the determination process. Article 27(1) when read in conjunction with Recital 19 is ,therefore, to be interpreted as allowing an asylum seeker to appeal a transfer decision on grounds that the Chapter III allocation criteria were incorrectly applied.
The application was in three parts: the applicants asked the tribunal to annul the police commissioner’s decision on how the registration of asylum requests was carried out in Paris; to compel the police commissioner to re-examine the methods of registration; to fine the state €1500. The first two parts of the application were granted but the third was not.
In the case of a claimant whose first asylum application would be viewed as being withdrawn by Bulgarian authorities, it cannot be ruled out that upon return to Bulgaria under a take back request the applicant would not be detained. In light of reported detention conditions the Secretary of State should have investigated the risk of a potential Article 3 violation if the applicant were to be returned to Bulgaria.
The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Bulgaria, and also overturned the placement of the Applicant in administrative detention for five days.
The court held that given the general state of reception conditions for asylum applicants in Bulgaria and the Applicant’s particular circumstances, in particular his physical vulnerability, there were substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for asylum applicants and that if the Applicant was handed over to Bulgarian authorities, his asylum application would not be properly examined or he would be at risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and paragraph 2 of article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”).
The Court of Appeal concluded that the referral of an appeal under the Dublin III Regulation to an administrative agency breaches an applicant’s right to efficient remedy.