Case summaries

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

The Syrian family's application for a Humanitarian Visa at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon fell outside the scope of the Visa Code, even if formally submitted on the basis of its Article 25(1)(a), because the purpose of the application (that is, to apply for asylum upon arrival to Belgium) differs from that of a short-term visa. 

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.

Wishing to challenge his transfer to Germany from Luxembourg, the applicant appealed this decision and the court found that, on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, all individuals had a right to contest the manner in which the Dublin III criteria are applied. 

The ECtHR ruled that the border-control procedure to which three Eritrean nationals were submitted did not provide adequate safeguards capable of protecting them from arbitrary removal. The applicants were on board a vessel docked in an Ukrainian port and were only allowed to disembark after the ECtHR indicated interim measures for that purpose. Therefore, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 13 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR.

On the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, the administrative tribunal found that all asylum applicants have a right to appeal the manner in which the responsibility criteria of Dublin III has been applied to their individual case and the determination of a responsible Member State where there are systemic deficiencies. 

The Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint lodged by the Polish Ombudsman in the case of a persecuted journalist forced to leave the country together with her son and accused of deception in order to obtain attestation of false information (in a form of a visa issued by a Consul). The Supreme Court agreed that there was a reasonable doubt with regard to the circumstances of the case and the guilt of the defendant. In the view of the Court, even if the defendant acted in a way which could be defined as deception in order to obtain attestation of false information, the circumstances of the case, the statements of the defendant and her clarifications should lead to a question whether the defendant could have acted in a state of necessity (i.e. the sole means by which she could have safeguarded an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril was to sacrifice another interest of lesser importance) while leaving the country.

The applicants’ detention under Article 5 (1) was arbitrary and did not ensure the principle of legal certainty; lack of information was contrary to Article 5 (2) and impaired their ability to challenge the detention decisions in violation of 5 (4). The conditions at the reception centre and the boats did not amount to a violation of Article 3, as the applicants’ stay was very short and there were not sufficient indications.

There was no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4, as the applicants have had a genuine and effective possibility during the entire procedure to raise concerns regarding obstacles to their return to Tunisia; there was similarly no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13, since the applicants’ complain would solely relate on the collective nature of their expulsion and not to any real risk of treatment contrary to Article 2 & 3 in Tunisia.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively provide the Applicant the possibility to resolve contradictions in his statements, as required by Article 16 of the Recast Procedures Directive (RPD).